Book Review: Ted Seay's Wild Bunch

There are moments in everyone’s development in any role that resonate.  From a father’s first realization to just how closely his young son watches (and sometimes to his horror, mimics) him, to that one positive or negative work experience that cements an attitude that lasts decades.  These moments figuratively fill us with a deep, full, reverberating sound that echoes in our mind’s ears whenever a decision is weighed.  “Remember when…”

This looks cool, but memory crystallization hurts like Hell....

                In my coaching life, one such event struck me in my formative years, the reading of one Ted Seay’s Wild Bunch: A Side Order of Football.  I have previous written about Ted’s concept of Unity of Apparent Intent.

                Ted’s most recent expansion, The Wild Bunch: A Conflict-Theoretical Approach to Offensive Football, is more than a mere re-write.  It is not just an unpacking of the what’s (plays), the how’s (technique), or even the why’s (philosophy)-though it has all of these.  It is a digestion down to the fundamental nature of football:  conflict.

 

                Ted’s mastery at analyzing this concept (on which his newest book wonderfully expounds), coupled with my firm belief that any coach cannot begin his education with fully understanding and owning this concept, has led me to recommend this book for several years to any coach wanting to learn more about offensive football.  Subsequently, dear reader, I also recommend it to you.

                I don’t care if you can diagram every play from Michigan in 1922, or Army in 1945, or Houston 1989, or Kentucky in 1997, or West Virginia in 2005, or Baylor in 2013…..without an understanding of the underlying principle of all these great offenses (beside having talent), you have the directions on how to build a fine sports car, but no idea how to use the tools.

                That underlying principle is conflict.  I mean, if one has the brute force to run wedge every play for no less than 3 yards, then that is exactly what they should do.  In the real world, however, no one is THAT much better than their opponents (and if you are, feel free to stop reading and go back to dusting your trophies).

 

                A conflicted defender is one who lack certainty about where the ball is/is going, and consequentially, where he should be heading.  Have you ever had a team period where the offensive coordinator just tells the offense to “run it again”, and everyone on the scout team hears it?  You never saw a cornerback fill on iso like that kid just did.

                The lack of conflict, and certainty with which the defense could sprint to ball creates very tough sledding, and soon the offensive coordinator is yelling at the scout defense to “play it honest”.

                It should also be noted, that space is a vital component (and in fact, the end goal) of conflict.  Even the phone booth knife fight that is the Double Wing offense wants to eventually get the ball in space.

                Those who doubt that last statement have never played a good DW team with the ability to go play action, and the corner route is so wide open your pregnant wife could throw the touchdown.  Conflict (secondary players needing to help on power) creates space (PAP over the top of flat footed cornerbacks).

                Ted expertly defines this in chapter 3 of his book:                                            

 

“…….don't take on your opponent at what he does best or where he is most concentrated. Coach Woody Hayes put it very well, misquoting Sun Tzu slightly, but to good effect: "Don't attack walled cities." I would add to that a corollary -- don't attack walled cities while the defenders are fresh and alert. Maneuver past the concentrations of enemy forces into open territory and ride like hell. Force your opponent to redeploy his forces to cover more ground, until you have him stretched thin from sideline to sideline. Then attack the walled city, while its defenders are out in the plains waiting for a cavalry end run that never comes.”



"Don't chase the enemies fly sweep!!  But still stop it somehow!"

                That concept alone is worth buying the book. 

                Ted goes on to lay out the personnel, formational structure, plays, drills, and practice plans associated with his offense, all the while relating his decision making back to the original premise of conflict theory.

                For years I have said this, and with this new edition (which stands apart from the rest), it has never been more true:  I do not care what offensive system you run, this is a MUST READ.

This ain’t your Mouse’s Run and Shoot

I’d like to take this opportunity to take a look at a lesser known variation of the run and shoot.

Hemlock, another contributor on this site, has fantastic insight into the Mouse/Jenkins/Jones version of the Run and Shoot that found it’s way into the NFL level in the early 90’s. The origins of that version of Run and Shoot, however, not only looked different in terms of plays and philosophy of attack, but also had a lesser known evolutionary branch that was basically limited to the Midwest United States, especially Indiana.

Glenn “Tiger” Ellison’s book should be required reading for all coaches, if for nothing else then the beginnings of the book where he talks about how he came to develop (truly create) an offense. More importantly, it details how his “coaching epiphany” allowed him to break out of the monotony of the generic offense and football philosophy which surrounded him.

(For the purists, forgive my shortened paraphrase)

Ellison was a coach at Middletown High School in Ohio, and it 1958 he found himself staring down a 1-4 record. Like Ohio State, under the guidance of Woody Hayes at the time, most high school teams relied on the “3 yards and a cloud of dust” approach. When things weren’t working, the players and coaches simply had to try harder. As Ellison noted, the idea was if the coaching staff and the 11 offensive players poured every ounce of themselves into the play, they could WILL themselves to at least 3 yards. This is a great thought. However, when you fail (and in competitive sport, there is always a loser), your failure is attributed to either your laziness, your inability to motivate, or both.

Ellison, like many football coaches, found himself putting more pressure on his staff, who put more pressure on the players, who in turn saw their execution and confidence falter.

It was during a trip to the park, probably to wonder about his job security, that Ellison had his epiphany. There, a group of kids were playing a pickup game of 2-hand touch football. Ellison watched as the QB, throwing on the run, would release the football to a receiver breaking toward grass. There was no diagram, no play call to follow, just “run out there and get open”.

I’d like to take a timeout to talk about Bob Gibson. Yeah, I know, way out of left field (no pun intended), but please bear with me.

In 1968, Bob Gibson had an ERA of 1.12, which is a record for the live ball era, and was just off the MLB record of .96 set during the dead ball era. Gibson was so dominant that after the 1968 season, MLB lowered the pitcher’s mound from 15 to 10 inches to give hitters a fighting chance.

During one game in the 68’ season, Bob gave up a single to the opposing pitcher, who was a notoriously bad batter. When asked by a reporter how he managed a hit off baseball’s most dominant hurler, the pitcher replied: “I closed my eyes, and I swung like hell!”

That, is exactly what Ellison started to do with his team at Middletown.

From the micro-managing, ultra-conservative, fist pounding coach came this new philosophy:

1.) Go reckless!

2.) Stay loose!

3.) Score now!

Practices became laid back. If it wasn’t fun, why were we doing it? Instead of detailing the quarterback’s mechanics and the receiver’s route stem and break, the coaching point became “you run out there, he’ll get open, and you throw it”.

Ellison spent the rest of that year operating out of the lonesome polecat, winning his remaining games. The following season, he add a little more systemization and developed a double wide, double slot set that is so recognizable as “Run and Shoot” today. It is important to realize that while he did add some structure to his offense, he now approached his problems from a pragmatic point of view, rather than a tacit, “this is the way we’ve always done it”/”everyone else does it this way” approach. The greatest minds in any field think this way. Anyway, he went on to be wildly successful, and even became an assistant for Woody Hayes at Ohio State.

Another quick aside: One of Ellison’s most prolific passing concepts was “Gangster”, which began by motioning into trips (which started the idea of using motion to identify coverage). Gangster was the grandfather of our modern day Go route, and basically looked like a flood route with the “deep out” guy simply finding grass.

The quarterback would roll right with the FB blocking and throw on the run. Ellison also gave his quarterback the unheard of freedom to roll the opposite way whenever he felt like it to throw what was essentially the choice route. Very cool.

Two coaches picked up on the basic structure and philosophy of Ellison. The first one you all know about. The second was a head coach at small private school in southern Indiana called Franklin College. His name was Stewart “Red” Faught. Facing limited scholarships, limited staff, and limited, well, just about everything else, Coach Faught knew trying to win the old way would not work. He needed an edge, and he found it in the animal Ellison created.

The main difference between Mouse’s version and Red’s version of the run and shoot lay not only in route structure, but in the philosophy of attack. Make no mistake, Red was shocking the folks in Indiana with how much he was throwing the football. Coach Faught said when the quarterback got off the bus he wanted the ball in the air until he got back on. One of my favorite Redism is: “Balance?! Hell, pass!”

However, Red’s version did include some wing-T run game elements whose primary function was to set up one of the most devastating Play Action Passing and Play Action Screen games ever devised. More than once, I’ve heard coaches who really knew him say he ran just enough for you to believe the play fakes.

Red’s run game included some base inside runs, and as expected, the draw. Later on, Red would become the offensive coordinator at Georgetown College (which, despite the fact they had several more scholarships, Red held a winning record against while at Franklin) and he added some triple option, setting the foundation for Georgetown to win the 2000 and 2001 NAIA national championship.

For the purposes of this article, I want to focus on his sweep and trap series. For those versed in the “fun” terminology that Ellison created, that would be “Texas” and “Popcorn”.

One of the improvements Red made to the run and shoot was use of Rocket Sweep. Ellison’s version utilized a orbit sweep with the FB leading off the edge. As early as the 1970’s Franklin College was running the Rocket, and few teams could keep up. Anyone who hasn’t checked out Ted Seay’s Wild Bunch manual needs to do so right now for the best explanation I’ve heard for the power of the Rocket Sweep.

While not from the same formation, this is the best diagram of Rocket Sweep I could find on Google…..and I did spend over 30 seconds looking.

The slot, sent in deep motion, should be behind the FB when the ball is snapped. The QB reverses out and pitches. The slot should catch the ball just as he is breaking the tackle box. Because they will never make a play, every down lineman inside a 5 technique can be left unblocked (many times, the 5 tech can’t make a play either and can be ignored), allowing offensive linemen to scramble to the second and third level.

The sweet part of rocket how it demands that the defense move pre-snap, because after we snap the ball you will be out of position. Obviously, like any sweep, you stop the Rocket by keeping contain and making the runner cut back into the defensive pursuit. It is the pursuit that sets up the constraint play known as “Popcorn” (trap).

Before we get into trap let’s examine a current trend in the NFL. Pre-inside zone, any team worth their salt stopped trap. Trap, power and power sweep were the basis of the NFL run game. Then, people started to pass and utilize area blocking. The demands on an Over Front 3 technique started to shift into a more penetrating, rush the passer, split the zone double type of player. The Warren Sapp’s of the world became gold. In the last few years, however, you can see a cyclical return to the use of trap as a constraint play, and NFL teams are garnering big yards. The Rocket Sweep and the roll-out pass game Red utilized lends itself to horizontal and vertical DL movement, and the trap take perfect advantage.

Again, bear with the diagram.

The left slot goes in Rocket motion to the right, and the QB opens up to his left (which is the same as if he were reversing out to pitch the sweep), and hands to the FB running trap to the right.

As we mentioned, this little series had the power to make defenses worry about the width of the field, and then make them pay when they rallied too strongly to the sweep. The real beauty, and what Red loved to do, was the Play Action Passes and Screens off this action.

To wrap up this article, we will look at Red’s best play action pass (Popcorn Pass), and then some of the screens he would throw off it.

Rocket motion, fake the trap, and boot to the smash route. Very much like an inverted Buck waggle. This was a simple play, yet with defensive secondary concerned with filling the alley on Rocket, it was a highly productive part of the playbook.

Another important difference between Mouse and Red was in protection. On Popcorn Pass, 7 blockers stayed in. Red also had an 8-man protection call “Everybody Block” (love it). With the ability to utilize more than just the 6-man protection Mouse and his heirs utilize, Red was not merely providing more protection for his quarterback, he was preparing to ATTACK the blitz.

The Superback screen in Mouse’s version of the run and shoot is deadly. One of those ‘just when you think you have everything covered’ type of plays. Everything looks like roll-out (60/61 protection), and then the OL releases up field and the FB curls around for the dump off screen. It is just so easy to discount a skill player staying in to pass protect.

That’s right, I went there……

What Red added was the ability to manufacture multiple screen looks (off roll and play action), using multiple screen men (FB and slots), while keeping it simple with one screen scheme (the OL just had ‘screen left’ and ‘screen right’). Again, it is so easy to ignore an offensive skill player tied up in protection, especially with so many moving pieces (rocket, trap, play action pass) going on around you.

In the Popcorn Pass diagram, you can see how easy it would be to slip screen the FB to the left, and also how easy it would be to slip screen the slot who stayed in to block to the right. Some of the biggest gainers in Franklin College history have come off simple dump offs to a screen man with a wall of undersized, but willing to cut block their grandmother down, offensive linemen in front.

I’m not advocating one style of run and shoot over the other. However, I cut my teeth on Red’s run and shoot attack; the offense and the man holds a special place in my heart.

Red Faught passed away during my sophomore season at Franklin College. I, along with 90 other players, attended his funeral in our game jerseys….each of us also wore a plain red baseball cap. Red always wore one on the sidelines, despite the fact Franklin’s school colors are blue and gold (I loved that about him). Obviously, that is why people called him “Red”. I had the pleasure of speaking to him a few times, and that philosophy to “go reckless and stay loose” (which Ellison coined and Red so ardently advocated) applies as much to football as it does life.

“Balance?! Hell, pass!”

Right on Coach Faught, right on.

Altering Post Snap Tempo

Much ado has been made of the importance of tempo in modern football.

Nowadays, it is less about what you are doing (option, power, air raid), and more about HOW you do it (huddle, different tempos, crazy fast).

The reasons why one goes no huddle are well versed. The main reason, as we have learned from our basketball counterparts, is to control the tempo of the game. The offense sets the pace, and whatever the philosophy, CONTROLLING that pace is a decided offensive advantage.

While some live in extremes (see Oregon), most teams find value in altering the tempo, either to the specific situation (2:00 time or kill clock time), or to simple prevent the defense from “settling in”. Like placing defenders in run/pass binds, attacking multiple areas along the LOS, and vertically and horizontally stretching zone droppers, varying tempo is just another way to make a defense stress, and ultimately, to break.

The point is, if you aren’t up on varying your pre-snap tempo, you need to be.

While this article is about POST snap tempo, it was necessary to talk through the philosophy and importance of pre-snap tempo in order to appreciate how post snap variance is also vital.

I’m going to use the offense I know as an example, but this is applicable to every system.

For our purposes, I want to examine two mainstays in the shotgun spread: zone read and flash screen.

The zone-read was the revolution of the past decade. By adding an option control on the backside of IZ, shotgun teams found they could run the football as well as their pro-style counterparts. Nowadays, a 6 man box is not in and of itself enough to keep a 10 personnel team from running the football.

The “ride and decide” meshing between the QB and RB creates a certain stimulus, to which the defense must react.

Your “reaction” defenders (namely, LB’s and DB’s) must maintain gap integrity while diagnosing and discerning who has the football. By it’s nature, the zone read takes time to develop. While defensive pressure can disrupt other running plays, zone blocking was designed to be gap sound and prevent penetration. In general, the BIG plays on zone read (and zone in general) come when a defense starts acting (aka, poking and hoping), rather than reacting. The very nature of option football also takes advantage of flying around without purpose.

So, the best reaction (post snap) is to fit into your run responsibility, diagnose whom the ball carrier is, and THEN rally to him.

A heavy zone read team will get a defense into this type modus operandi within a couple series.

Our second play, flash screens, do so much for a spread team.

Beyond the purposes of this post, perimeter screens force defenses to occupy and play in space (must line up properly), and are easy ways to get the ball to an athlete (like Crabtree).

For the purposes of this article, they are also a great way to vary that post snap “ride and decide” stimulus of the zone read, of which the defense just got a steady diet.

Essentially, a flash screen has the same run fits as sweep, it just threatens about twice as fast.

So, we have moved from a play that requires a defense to be gap responsible and react slowly, to a play that demands they get there NOW! After a steady diet of either stimulus, the defense will be less ready (less conditioned) to handle the other, simply by virtue of having altered their post snap decision-making process.

I’m gonna call on my dogs to explain this a little more.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings….Hey, where did all this slobber come from?

THE BIG POINT:

The analogy of a boxer has been used to describe many things as it pertains to offensive play calling, and we can now add helping to relate the idea of post snap tempo to the list.

A boxer switches between short jabs and big hooks/cross/uppercuts for many reasons. You pound (weaken) with your jabs. You get an opponent use to defending jabs, then, at the opportune moment, you throw one of the other aforementioned strikes to do real damage.

For our purposes, these strikes also compliment each other in the manner (speed and position) in which strike. Throw nothing but jabs, and you might as well be tickle fighting a real boxer, but when you can mix it up, changing the speed and position of the assault, your opponent can’t find a rhythm.

In football terms, keeping a defense “off rhythm” is the name of the game.

Unity of Apparent Intent

The following is a synopsis of what I consider the finest, free playbook on the internet:

Ted Seay (who, despite our never having met, has influenced me greatly) now has this gem in it’s 4th edition (available here). Schematically, 10/20 personnel Wing-T that combines series based runs with modern horizontal and vertical stretches is my cup of tea. Even if it is not your brand of football, I stand by my sentiment that EVERYONE concerned with offensive football should read this document.

In particular, as feeble an attempt as it may be, I would like to review Mr. Seay’s concept of “unity of apparent intent” (UAI). My intention is certainly not to add to this idea, nor do I trust I can adequately rehash it. My hope is to relay enough information that your interest is peaked and you will do yourself the service of reading about the “side order of football”.

WHAT IT IS…

The UAI is all about deception, a key component of the Wild bunch offense (and every other scheme). Starting at page 154 of the linked document, Mr. Seay artfully ties military strategy with football philosophy, creating his theory of attack as it pertains to offensive football. Again, go read the document for this valuable insight, as the scope of Mr. Seay’s theory (The Tao of Deception) is another article in and of itself. For now, I want to focus on what this means from a series based approach.

Creating conflict, in its most simple form, involves attacking a defender’s over reaction to a base play.

The above diagram is a crude drawing of the curl-flat concept, where by the Flat Defender ($) is placed in a no-win situation. He can either cover the out route and allow the Curl to materialize behind and inside of him, or he can sink to the curl and give up the easy throw to the out.

It is a typical 2 on 1 stretch that many offensive passing concepts seek to create, and unless the flat defender receives help from one of his teammates, the only thing stopping the offense from running curl-flat all the way down the field is a lack of offensive execution.

So here is what happens:

The cornerback (C) will only allow 10 yards completions happen right in front of him for so long before he starts playing the curl (instead of his deep 1/3 responsibility). Attacking overreaction (cheating of assignment, over aggression, etc.) is what series based play calling/offensive structure is all about.

Another crude drawing, but the wheel tag is an excellent way to attack a CB who is jumping curl routes. Essentially, we are attacking the primary responsibility of a player who has abandoned it in favor of “plugging the dike” somewhere else.

So, that is a simple example of what we mean generally by “creating conflict”. The UAI, however, is about the details. It’s about making Y’s out and wheel routes stem the exact same way. When two things look the same, but end up attacking a defensive in ways that are not only different, but in fact complimentary, then you have developed the unity of apparent intent to your advantage.

Imagine the CB has a great position coach….one who is determined to make cover 3 work against this little curl-flat with the wheel tag package. He decides to teach his CB to key #2 (Y) in his backpedal. He notices that on Curl flat, Y will vertical stem his route before breaking it hard to the flat. On the Wheel, however, Y will stem straight toward the sidelines and start to veer up field.

So, if Y stems vertical, then the CB has the ability to press the curl…….if Y immediately releases to the flat, then the CB knows he must play the wheel. The pattern of an offensive player’s movement tells the defender where he needs to be.

When it comes to making offensive decisions about “how do we run this route”, etc., this must be in the forefront of the play designer’s mind. Routes need to stem the same way (and runs need to look the same too) in order to keep the defense in a state of confusion/uncertainty. When an offense eliminates cues as to their intention, thereby gaining UAI, the offense functions far more efficiently.

For Mr. Seay, this culminated in how he blocked Fly sweep and the FB compliment off it for his Wild bunch.

Coming from a Wing-T background, Mr. Seay’s original version had pulling OG’s on the sweeps. After much study, he finally decided to switch to zone blocking everything.

The result is a truly UNREADABLE offensive series that starts with Jet Sweep (with OZ blocking). The compliment is the front side IZ run with the FB, which Mr. Seay’s research has shown actually averages more yards per call than the sweep. The OL movement and backfield mechanics look EXACTLY the same on both plays, leaving defenders without a reliable visual key.

We talked about curl-flat and Jet Sweep series, but this concept needs to be built into everything you do, regardless of your offense flavor.

Obviously the ability to execute is paramount, but winning football games against good competition comes down to details. That guy running the Jet needs to move at the same pre-snap speed and purpose whether he is getting the ball or not. We can’t cheat initial movements too much (though a little may be advisable in certain situations), and especially if we do not have a GOOD REASON for it.

Again, great stuff from Mr. Seay.

NEW NOTE:

I appreciate the comments.

Per Mr. Seay's invitation, here is a link to some new WB material:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25907198/Wild-Bunch-5-0-2010

Enjoy it.......I know I will!

Billick Case Study: Complete season

First off, I learned an important rule for blogging: don’t make promises you can’t keep.

I apologize to those who were sitting on pins and needles for my article……I hope both of you can forgive me…….especially you, Mom.

In all seriousness, I do apologize for the delay, I didn’t keep my word to get this to you in a timely manner, and that is not cool.

With that out of the way, let’s apply this study to a season’s worth of statistics.

Before we begin, MAD props to coach fingerz42, a member of Coach Huey's X's and O's site.

Seriously, if you find this to be of any use, send him a PM and let him know you appreciate his work. He was absolutely awesome, and this article would not be possible without him.

Coach fingerz42 is the first year head coach at "High School X". Suffice to say, they struggled in year one (hence the anonymity). Coach fingerz42 brought a new identity to the program, and the growing pains were evident. The team battled to a 2-8 record, and averaged 9 points a game. The adversity of learning a new scheme was further complicated by the loss of his starting quarterback in week 2.

With all due respect to Coach, the poor performance of his 2010 offensive squad makes this analysis especially exciting. The more an offense's talent outweighs that of the defense, the less important 1st down efficiency becomes. If you can have a holding penalty (1st and 20), a reverse for 1 yard (2nd and 19), a QB scramble for 6 (3rd and 13), and then throw a comeback for 15 yards consistently, then either your team is full of studs, or this must be your opponent:

Don’t laugh, these guys may win the Big East’s automatic qualifier in 2011

Team X's lack of offensive prowess, coupled with staring down a massive talent gap nearly every game, made staying on schedule exponentially vital, and that is something Coach told me he plans on scrutinizing more carefully in 2011 (good for him).

Before we examine Team X's first down statistics, let's see how they did in the other 3 areas Billick considers vital to offensive success:

1. Turnovers: Team X turned the ball over 26 times in 10 games. Obviously, stemming this tide is priority number one, of which Coach is well aware.


2. Explosive Plays: Coach didn't keep stats, but when you average under 200 yards a game in total offense, you can figure this is also an area in which Team X needs to improve.


3. Red Zone Efficiency: 9 scores in 19 trips. Lack of opportunities and low efficiency.

Despite the obvious shortcomings in these categories, the case could be made that they all trace the root of their trouble back to first down efficiency.

Falling behind (on the series and the scoreboard) leads to more passing, and when you are a run first team with a backup quarterback, throwing in predictable situations is a recipe for disaster (picks, punts, and poor field position).

This serves to highlight an importance game planning aspect for run first teams: If you plan on attacking a defense 80% run and 20% pass, merely having that ratio in the final box score doesn't mean you accomplished anything. If your 20% came in predictable situations (3rd and long, 2:00 situations, etc.), then there is exists NO semblance of balance, and conversely, there is no defensive imbalance.

Offensive football is all about stressing the defense as a means to the ultimate end: crossing the goal line. There is nothing wrong with wanting to run the ball 80-90% of the time, as long as you avoid predictability.

First Downs

What really got me excited about Coach's team was his breakdown of conversion percentages for those first down plays that garnered over and under 4 yards, respectively: On first downs where the offense gained 4 yards or more, they went to convert 80% of the time.

On first downs where the offense failed to gain 4 yards or more, that percentage fell to 31%

Think about this....here's a team that to the naked eye can't seem to do anything right (again, all due respect to coach fingerz42, almost all of us have been there), and yet, when they manage to gain 4 or more on first down, they manage to move the chains a whopping 80% of the time!

Now, the rub comes when we examine the frequency of these +4 gainers.

On the season, Team X had 194 first down opportunities. On 129 of these (66%), Team X failed to gain 4 yards.

Sidetrack

The big question for Coach this off-season is to figure out how to create more 2nd and <6. In fact, from the conversations we’ve had, I know he is already working on his first down success through 2 important endeavors that all coaches need proficiency in:

Our staff calls it the R&D department……..recruitment and development; THE foundation of any program.

The following conversation was overheard at a clinic between coaches from rival schools (as far as any of you know):

Coach 1: "We just couldn't stop you guys from hitting the speed out. We used our Tango technique, then switched to the Dragon Claw alignment, and even whipped out the Lombardi Kung Fu grip and we STILL couldn't handle it. What are you guys doing to make that that route so effective for you?"

Coach 2: "Our fast kid runs it."

Word?

All this effort into analysis and stat tracking will flesh out an extra game or two on your season (which can mean a world of difference), but the real wins come in the off-season.

Practical Applications

So, how can we make this work for us?

While I place a great deal of emphasis on analysis as it relates to decision making, there is no need to go all Beautiful Mind on your football team…

If you know a team runs Power Right out of the Pro-I forty-three percent of the time when on the left hash facing 2^nd and 5 in the 3^rd quarter when the wind is over 10 mph blowing from the west and the blah, blah, blah……….

Focus on the big things, and the little things will handle themselves.

Our staff (limited in time and man power) has started to focus on the follow areas:

1. First down tendency


2. 3^rd down tendency


3. GL tendency

We look at our opponents respective offensive and defensive strategies in these three areas and plan accordingly.

We also find 16 year old kids can remember a couple 1^st down tendencies (2 main runs, favorite pass), and a couple situational items (3^rd and long…..draw, verticals, etc.).

I wish you happy hunting. I hope this helps, and if you have analysis of your team, please feel free to share.

And again, one last BIG shout out to coach for making this article possible.

Weird stats

I was checking out smart football, and I enjoyed Chris' recent article on underdog strategy (great stuff).

However, Mr. Brown ends his article with some troubling findings, courtesy of the gentlemen over at Advance NFL Stats.

Given the choice between kicking or receiving, conventional wisdom is to always take the ball. The only time you consider kicking is when you defer your decision to the second half, as a strategic tactic. If you use that strategy, then you always elect to receive after halftime.

This is not ground breaking to anyone……you want the ball, unless you can get it later.

What Advance NFL Stats discovered, however, is the team that receives to open a half will actually LOSE a majority of those respective halves.

This flies in the face of conventional wisdom, even challenging that long held, irrefutable tenant of successful football: maintaining possession.

I have only one plausible justification, albeit an anecdotal explanation (and I am wide open to other thoughts).

I'll take the word of this man:

You may recognize this gentlemen (Elmer Layden, Notre Dame Head Coach 34'-41') from a more famous picture from his playing days:

I remember reading "It Was A Different Game: The Elmer Layden Story" when I was in high school (I highly recommend it both for history of the game, and insight into Coach Rockne), and in the chapter where the late coach was espousing his football strategy, he mentioned he often considered a quick kick on 1^st down when backed up against his own end zone.

Being 18 and knowing it all, I immediately wrote this off as archaic football strategy from the days of no facemasks and 7-3 thrillers.

Maybe, without the use of the internet and fancy algorithms, Coach Layden knew something we lost………that field position, not possession of the football, is the prime asset.

Interesting.

The average NFL kickoff return nets 22 yards.

If the defense forces a punt inside their opponent's 40, and given an average net punting yardage of 40 yards, then the starting field position for the team who kicked off can be expected anywhere from their own 30 to mid-field, segments of the gridiron where the odds of a drive ending in a touchdown increase substantially.

In short, it is (or may be) better to kick-off and then receive a punt, because of the relative real estate you are afforded in those respective situations.

This also serves to underline the important role garnering explosives plays in stemming the field position tide. If one can complete a 20 yard pass during the drive, and subsequently can punt from their opponent's 40, then they have relieved their burden and placed it on the other team.

Finally, in another fine article from Advance NFL Stats, this dynamic serves to highlight the importance of a player like this.

I don't think it is enough to make me not want the football, although I have some serious rationalizing to do to overcome the weight of these findings.

If anyone has any other ideas, feel free to share.

A desperate act......

Per Mr. Brophy's latest post, I have been added to the faculty here at Cripes......




I am a lay coach at West Washington High School, a small corporation in Southern Indiana. My primary football interests center around Offensive Line play, offensive scheme and philosophy, offensive tempo, and program development.

I do not claim anything more than a novice level of understanding in any of the aforementioned subjects, but I am honored to be part of one of the best football blogs on the net.

I'll try to contribute some intelligent insight, but at times the truth may become painfully obvious.......

Dubber: Effectively Measuring Offensive Efficiency

brilliant perspective and analysis courtesy of new author and face-melter, dubber

In "Developing an Offensive Gameplan", Brian Billick, using years of statistical data, identifies the four main areas critical to an offense's success (or attributable to its failure).

They are:

1. Turnovers (pretty self-evident)
2. Explosive Plays (defined as runs over 12 and passes over 15, given an even turnover margin, teams who garner at least 2 more explosive than their opponents will win about 80% of the time)
3. Red Zone Efficiency
4. Success on First Down (success defined as 4 or more yards). (The math behind this is a successful 1st down will populate a shorter 3rd down, which is easier to convert.)

I kept statistics concerning these four areas while watching the Seahawks and the Rams. This was an excellent game to apply this study to, because I generally feel the respective defenses of these two clubs are better than their offensive counterparts, and both punters, kickers, and coverage units had excellent games.

This puts the onus on the offensive gameplan and decision making.

As a side note, I have done this a couple of times now, and while the reports are getting better, I think keeping track of a couple other items (1st down run/pass ratio, and 3rd down conversions by distances) would be helpful. For the future.....

So..........

1. Turnovers were even (one each)
2. Explosive plays............few and far between, but they were correlated to scoring drives, notably the only touchdown in the game, which was set up courtesy of the game's biggest play (61 yard pass play)----------the Seahawks garnered this bomb, as well one more total explosive overall.
3. 2 visits apiece, with the Seahawks coming away with 10 points to the Rams 6. The penalty in the red zone for the Rams was killer..........

It was probably these two categories that won the Seahawks the game.

I really didn't care who won this game, but of particular interest to me was the first down statistics, which bear out an important lesson from which coaches can learn.

4. First down

I took note of the yardage gained on every first down of the game. I computed an average. More importantly, I also took note of what happen from a conversion standpoint (IE, getting another first down) on first downs that garnered 4 or more yards, AND those that did not.

If I may put the cart before the horse, the Seahawks had 30 first down opportunities to the Rams 19.

• The Seahawks averaged 5.5 yards on first down
• The Rams averaged 4.2

While that tells the tale, it is also slightly misleading........obviously, whether the offense gains 13 or 50 yards on 1st down, they get another first down........and that 50 yarder can bolster my average enough to cover up my overall inefficiency on first down.

More important is to observe the RATIO in which I experience success on first down, not my average 1st down yardage.

• Of the 30 times the Seahawks had a first down, they gained 4 or more a total of 17 times (57 %).
• Of the 19 times the Rams had a first down, they gained to gain 4 or more a total of 9 times (53 %).

A big advantage for the Seahawks was their ability to overcome gaining less than 4 yards on first down.........they went ahead and converted 38% compared to the Rams 22%.

This was not due to a proficiency on 3rd down and long (in fact, both of these teams were generally sucky on 3rd and medium to long)..........a large part of this game was actually won and lost on SECOND DOWN!

The Rams (perhaps due to that first quarter bomb and the way the Seahawks were able to recognize and attack man coverage) played softer, zone coverage on 2nd down. Couple this with the Seahawks willingness to throw high percentage, risk averse passes on 1st and 2nd down (which is pretty ballsy when you are rolling with your backup quarterback), and you have a recipe for getting back into a manageable 3rd down situation.................

Here's the real kicker, and if you take nothing else from this, take this (remembering these teams are very poor offensively): Combined, the two team had 26 first down plays that gained 4 or more yards, and of those, only 6 failed to result in another first down.

That means that 77% of the time either of these teams gained 4 or more yards on first down, they ended up converting for another first down.

So, how is this helpful?

Go back to those couple of games where you felt like you didn't execute offensive, but should have. Not the game you blew a team out, and not the game where you were blown out........but that game that was close, or that you should have won, but your offense just struggled. Go back and look at just the yards gained on first down..................see what that tells you.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE SECOND OF TWO POSTS ON THIS SUBJECT, ADDRESSING SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO ADD TO FUTURE ANALYSIS: FIRST DOWN PLAY SELECTION AND THIRD DOWN CONVERSION PERCENTAGES.

Charting first down is really the most time consuming part of this exercise. Turnovers are easy to count, as are red zone visits and explosive plays. Charting first down production means I must be completely focused on the television (something that rarely holds my full attention for hours on end).

I think 1st down run/pass ratio would be a huge addition, but I want it to be more structured than merely listing percentages........I would like to have some way to account for variance. For example, if I say a team threw 75% of the time on first down, that may be misleading if they throw a ton of screens. Also, there is a difference, in my mind, between taking a PA shot on first down, and taking a 3-step and throwing quick game. As a side note, while I believe the overarching theme of successful first downs should be unpredictability and balance, I would (personally) skew my first down gameplan more toward quick passing game than PA. I'd rather have the higher probability of 2nd and medium than risk an incompletion and leave 2nd and long.

Remember, an incompletion means you failed to gain 4 yards on first down, and are now off schedule...........and when the defense is better than you (a situation both offenses faced last night), you MUST stay on schedule.

Not that I wouldn't (and don't) take shots on first down, it just wouldn't figure predominantly into my general gameplanning practices.........

The type of PA also makes a difference........booting and throwing the comeback or the flat route is higher percentage than dropping straight back and throwing the NCAA route off run action.

And I understand, most PAP's have check downs, but I would like to have some way to delineate between taking a shot, and moving the pocket/still throwing high %.....which, given TV's horrible angles, would be hard.

At any rate, I would love anyone's thoughts on how to break this down.

Maybe the following 5 categories would work: quick/short passing, Verticals, PA's (maybe look at the difference between "going deep" and "high %"?), Runs, and Screens?

As I think about, perhaps screens could be sub-divided even further, as perimeter screens and slower developing slip or middle screens have entirely different functions for an offense.

Personally, a perimeter screen is like call sweep, and I consider it a safe way to get the ball in space (and get my 4 yards). Meanwhile, the latter mentioned screens are more like "home run" swings against a pressuring defense (lump them in with "PA shots").

3rd down

The really interesting thing Billick found about 3rd down is the conversion ratios for long, medium, and short were pretty standard. There wasn't a ton of deviation from the best to the worst offenses. For example, most teams convert about 80% of their 3rd and 1 situations, and convert a low percentage of 3rd and longs.

Doesn't matter if you are the Patriots or the Dolphins.

The difference?

The better offensive teams excelled at have MORE 3rd and short opportunities, while the bad offensive teams routinely faced drive killing (and turnover riddled) 3rd and long..........a direct result of good teams have first down success.

Still, it would be fun to chart that conversion ratio, maybe doing that a couple of times would reveal something about 3rd down philosophy.

As a final note, it was evident on 3rd down how much the Rams were still holding Bradford's hand...........their gameplan called for them to run only one formation on third and long (3x1 open with a compressed 2 and 3).........this kind of simplicity works just fine in high school, but in the NFL it's a different story.

I plan on taking some of the ideas in this second section and applying them when I do my next study (I'm thinking Colts/Jets), so if any of you have categorical or organizational suggestions, I'd love to hear them.