Showing posts with label Offense. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Offense. Show all posts

Saturday, March 8, 2014

Get Better

OHIO OPTION CLINIC

We're deep into clinic season and hope you've found some good speakers or programs to visit.  Courtesy of Malone University in Ohio, here is a great analysis of how to structure your concepts (regardless of your offense).




ALL22 NCAA FILM 

Thanks to the grind of all-everything Coach Alex Kirby, you don't have to have a deep library of film to barter with shady back alley traders.  Coach Kirby has launched his library sharing site - http://www.all22video.com/

Yearly and monthly subscriptions are available to check out this collection of NCAA game film.

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Coach Vint: Pistol Architect



With the NFL now adopting several of the key innovations of the last decade, the advantages of using the pistol are now more widely acknowledged.  Fortunately, the leading offensive mind on this subject has embraced the various forms of media and is sharing his invaluable insights to advance the game.


Here are clips of Vint installing the offense at Iowa Wesleyan, now visit and subscribe to his online resources!




Sunday, February 3, 2013

Ernie Zampese: Air Coryell

Circa 1992, the backbone of "Air Coryell", Ernie Zampese, breaks down how he packages strong side, three-receiver concepts.   These universal staples are what most of the modern passing game is premised on. Get an inside look at how the Sid Gilman offense is built and why  




As lagniappe, here is Zampese's route tree from Dallas



In the coming weeks, to honor "clinic season", we'll be sharing various clinic videos (many 'vintage' era) to help your staff for next season.

Other clinic videos to check out:

Sunday, January 13, 2013

Jay Rodgers: Packaging Your Spread Offense



Take a look at how to package your offense from Robert McFarland's Iowa State Cyclones of 2008, presented by receiver coach, Jay Rodgers.  Be sure to take advantage of similar posts for more information:

Thursday, December 13, 2012

Bill Walsh - Priorities and Practice


What's important in offensive football....

Enjoy his opening commentary on Buddy Ryan 

Sunday, September 9, 2012

College Football Y'all

Hope you got a chance to catch some of the quality college football match-ups this weekend.  I found a few observations worth mentioning from some of the Air Raid patriarchs.

Mike Leach – I haven’t paid much attention to Leach this spring/summer, opting to rather wait and see how things played out in the fall before offering any editorial.  It appears as though he is picking up right where he left off from a philosophy standpoint (wide splits, vertical attack focus).  On one of WSU’s first explosive plays featured an effective smash adjustment into the boundary, converting #1’s hitch into a post once the split-safety widens to match the (corner) bend of #2, leaving a middle-of-the-field void. 


smash conversion


Noel Mazzone – Like Leach, Mazzone is doing exactly as he had on his last stop; streamlined efficiency centered on horizontal stretch of perimeter defenders. Mazzone has also adapted the Holgorsen, Franklin (TFS), 3-back change-up to capitalize on defensive personnel adjustments. Similar to the two quarterbacks he had at ASU, Mazzone’s UCLA quarterback, Brett Hundley, finished with a more than respectable 75% completion ratio.


Tony Franklin – I am really glad Hurricane Isaac delayed last week’s Louisiana Tech – Texas A&M matchup until October 18, because it should allow enough time for a larger viewing audience to develop an interest.  There is plenty to take note of with Tony Franklin’s offense, much of which we’ve previously written about.  Of note are the contributions of freshmen Tevin King and Kenneth Dixon who came out of nowhere (plenty of depth with solid running backs) with over a 6 yard per carry average.  Those are impressive stats, but I think it also drives home Franklin’s aggressive style for playing offense.  


Tech has incorporated more inside zone this year and you may not find a team this year more adept at quick perimeter screens (particularly solid, rocket/laser with linemen).  Of course, the one thing you can learn from Tech is how committed to tempo they are.  They never move slower than snapping within 20 seconds of the spot and when they operate in “attack” tempo, no defense is safe. Even while leading with only 43 seconds left in the first half and receiving to start the second half, Franklin still attempted to work the clock and drive the field for points.  This style of play helped them break out of their own 1 yard line in the third quarter and score on a 4 play drive.
They’re going so fast there’s no time to explain what’s happening 
– CBS Color commentator, Ron Zook, during the Louisiana Tech game broadcast
There is nothing "soft" or finesse about this brand of football.  It is fast and nasty - both UCLA and La Tech relentlessly paced through 94 total offensive plays for over 600 yards total offense with over 250 yards rushing and 5 TDs.

Here are two observations I felt like taking a look at.
Fire (stretch read) with predetermined cutback

Fire (stretch read) with built-in option throw

Thursday, October 20, 2011

Rich Rodriguez Spread Offense

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Like the Calvin Magee clinic? How about hearing from the man himself, Rich Rodriguez?

Six more hours of spread offense dissection from one of the decade’s biggest names.  This clinic took place just before Rodriguez took over at West Virginia while he was making a name for himself under Tommy Bowden at Clemson.

While nothing went according to plan at Michigan, the innovations Rodriguez spearheaded at Tulane, Clemson, and finally West Virginia, became his thumbprint on many offenses we’re seeing today (particularly in the run game).  What if Rich Rod stayed at WVU instead of trying to resurrect  Michigan? What if they actually landed Terrelle Pryor in 2008 instead of having to pin their last desperate hopes on Denard Robinson?  UM’s defense certainly didn’t help matters, but it makes for an interesting look at how drastically perceptions would change if a few chance events took place.
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In the late 90s, while other programs were rediscovering athleticism at quarterback (McNabb at Syracuse / Vick at Va Tech), Rodriguez was capturing lightning in a bottle by paring athletes (Shaun King, Woody Dantzler) with complimentary, multiple option threats from the gun.  If you have the old (now canonized) Alex Gibbs Gilman clinic on wide-zone, you’ll hear Gibbs marvel over what kind of mileage coaches were getting out of Dantzler at the time.  In the infancy of his philosophy, it was applying extremely simple concepts from the gun and capitalizing on the low-hanging fruit of “athletes in space”.  It was by adapting to the talent on the roster to the innovations of defensive adjustments, borrowing from other successful programs (Northwestern), and acquiring an infusion of  expertise (Rick Trickett), that Rodriguez became increasingly successful through the height of his career.
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Rodriguez essentially set the table for up-tempo offenses of today (Oregon, Oklahoma State, etc) that have taken the best of both worlds (spread option with proven Air Raid concepts)  and evolved into a multi-dimensional threat to defenses.  Did Rodriguez plateau or hit the creative wall before leaving WVU?  The offense relied heavily on zone read and speed option with the passing game usually a result of play-action or a simplified 2-man-game.  Was he the victim of a program in decline, a dried up well (little recruiting help), or did his offense simply fail to evolve itself to the defense’s natural response? Will we witness his return to the coaching ranks, adapting his offense to the new decade’s defenses?





Most of the second session illustrates what Rodriguez was doing at Clemson.  Since part of this discussion relates to how that offense changed through the decade, here is some supporting evidence:



Sunday, October 2, 2011

Calvin Magee: Rodriguez Spread Offense

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It wasn’t long ago that the West Virginia football program was known for an entirely different high-octane offense.  That offense was spearheaded by a coach who is now deemed a pariah after languishing at Michigan for the past few years.  Rich Rodriguez used this simple brand of  fast-paced-spread to pressure defenses during his stops at Glenville State, Tulane, Clemson and West Virginia.
MageeMichigan
Now at Pittsburgh, Calvin Magee was an integral part in developing this ‘spread to run’ offense that Rodriguez became renowned for.  In his own words and philosophy, here are 5 hours worth……

Thursday, August 11, 2011

This ain’t your Mouse’s Run and Shoot

I’d like to take this opportunity to take a look at a lesser known variation of the run and shoot.


now attack


Hemlock, another contributor on this site, has fantastic insight into the Mouse/Jenkins/Jones version of the Run and Shoot that found it’s way into the NFL level in the early 90’s. The origins of that version of Run and Shoot, however, not only looked different in terms of plays and philosophy of attack, but also had a lesser known evolutionary branch that was basically limited to the Midwest United States, especially Indiana.


Glenn “Tiger” Ellison’s book should be required reading for all coaches, if for nothing else then the beginnings of the book where he talks about how he came to develop (truly create) an offense. More importantly, it details how his “coaching epiphany” allowed him to break out of the monotony of the generic offense and football philosophy which surrounded him.


(For the purists, forgive my shortened paraphrase)


Ellison was a coach at Middletown High School in Ohio, and it 1958 he found himself staring down a 1-4 record. Like Ohio State, under the guidance of Woody Hayes at the time, most high school teams relied on the “3 yards and a cloud of dust” approach. When things weren’t working, the players and coaches simply had to try harder. As Ellison noted, the idea was if the coaching staff and the 11 offensive players poured every ounce of themselves into the play, they could WILL themselves to at least 3 yards. This is a great thought. However, when you fail (and in competitive sport, there is always a loser), your failure is attributed to either your laziness, your inability to motivate, or both.


Ellison, like many football coaches, found himself putting more pressure on his staff, who put more pressure on the players, who in turn saw their execution and confidence falter.


It was during a trip to the park, probably to wonder about his job security, that Ellison had his epiphany. There, a group of kids were playing a pickup game of 2-hand touch football. Ellison watched as the QB, throwing on the run, would release the football to a receiver breaking toward grass. There was no diagram, no play call to follow, just “run out there and get open”.


I’d like to take a timeout to talk about Bob Gibson. Yeah, I know, way out of left field (no pun intended), but please bear with me.


Bob_Gibson


In 1968, Bob Gibson had an ERA of 1.12, which is a record for the live ball era, and was just off the MLB record of .96 set during the dead ball era. Gibson was so dominant that after the 1968 season, MLB lowered the pitcher’s mound from 15 to 10 inches to give hitters a fighting chance.


During one game in the 68’ season, Bob gave up a single to the opposing pitcher, who was a notoriously bad batter. When asked by a reporter how he managed a hit off baseball’s most dominant hurler, the pitcher replied: “I closed my eyes, and I swung like hell!”


That, is exactly what Ellison started to do with his team at Middletown.


From the micro-managing, ultra-conservative, fist pounding coach came this new philosophy:


1.) Go reckless!


2.) Stay loose!


3.) Score now!


Practices became laid back. If it wasn’t fun, why were we doing it? Instead of detailing the quarterback’s mechanics and the receiver’s route stem and break, the coaching point became “you run out there, he’ll get open, and you throw it”.


Ellison spent the rest of that year operating out of the lonesome polecat, winning his remaining games. The following season, he add a little more systemization and developed a double wide, double slot set that is so recognizable as “Run and Shoot” today. It is important to realize that while he did add some structure to his offense, he now approached his problems from a pragmatic point of view, rather than a tacit, “this is the way we’ve always done it”/”everyone else does it this way” approach. The greatest minds in any field think this way. Anyway, he went on to be wildly successful, and even became an assistant for Woody Hayes at Ohio State.


Another quick aside: One of Ellison’s most prolific passing concepts was “Gangster”, which began by motioning into trips (which started the idea of using motion to identify coverage). Gangster was the grandfather of our modern day Go route, and basically looked like a flood route with the “deep out” guy simply finding grass.


Gangster


The quarterback would roll right with the FB blocking and throw on the run. Ellison also gave his quarterback the unheard of freedom to roll the opposite way whenever he felt like it to throw what was essentially the choice route. Very cool.


Two coaches picked up on the basic structure and philosophy of Ellison. The first one you all know about. The second was a head coach at small private school in southern Indiana called Franklin College. His name was Stewart “Red” Faught. Facing limited scholarships, limited staff, and limited, well, just about everything else, Coach Faught knew trying to win the old way would not work. He needed an edge, and he found it in the animal Ellison created.


The main difference between Mouse’s version and Red’s version of the run and shoot lay not only in route structure, but in the philosophy of attack. Make no mistake, Red was shocking the folks in Indiana with how much he was throwing the football. Coach Faught said when the quarterback got off the bus he wanted the ball in the air until he got back on. One of my favorite Redism is: “Balance?! Hell, pass!”


However, Red’s version did include some wing-T run game elements whose primary function was to set up one of the most devastating Play Action Passing and Play Action Screen games ever devised. More than once, I’ve heard coaches who really knew him say he ran just enough for you to believe the play fakes.


Red’s run game included some base inside runs, and as expected, the draw. Later on, Red would become the offensive coordinator at Georgetown College (which, despite the fact they had several more scholarships, Red held a winning record against while at Franklin) and he added some triple option, setting the foundation for Georgetown to win the 2000 and 2001 NAIA national championship.


For the purposes of this article, I want to focus on his sweep and trap series. For those versed in the “fun” terminology that Ellison created, that would be “Texas” and “Popcorn”.


One of the improvements Red made to the run and shoot was use of Rocket Sweep. Ellison’s version utilized a orbit sweep with the FB leading off the edge. As early as the 1970’s Franklin College was running the Rocket, and few teams could keep up. Anyone who hasn’t checked out Ted Seay’s Wild Bunch manual needs to do so right now for the best explanation I’ve heard for the power of the Rocket Sweep.


rocket_diagram6


While not from the same formation, this is the best diagram of Rocket Sweep I could find on Google…..and I did spend over 30 seconds looking.


The slot, sent in deep motion, should be behind the FB when the ball is snapped. The QB reverses out and pitches. The slot should catch the ball just as he is breaking the tackle box. Because they will never make a play, every down lineman inside a 5 technique can be left unblocked (many times, the 5 tech can’t make a play either and can be ignored), allowing offensive linemen to scramble to the second and third level.


The sweet part of rocket how it demands that the defense move pre-snap, because after we snap the ball you will be out of position. Obviously, like any sweep, you stop the Rocket by keeping contain and making the runner cut back into the defensive pursuit. It is the pursuit that sets up the constraint play known as “Popcorn” (trap).


Before we get into trap let’s examine a current trend in the NFL. Pre-inside zone, any team worth their salt stopped trap. Trap, power and power sweep were the basis of the NFL run game. Then, people started to pass and utilize area blocking. The demands on an Over Front 3 technique started to shift into a more penetrating, rush the passer, split the zone double type of player. The Warren Sapp’s of the world became gold. In the last few years, however, you can see a cyclical return to the use of trap as a constraint play, and NFL teams are garnering big yards. The Rocket Sweep and the roll-out pass game Red utilized lends itself to horizontal and vertical DL movement, and the trap take perfect advantage.


trap


Again, bear with the diagram.


The left slot goes in Rocket motion to the right, and the QB opens up to his left (which is the same as if he were reversing out to pitch the sweep), and hands to the FB running trap to the right.


As we mentioned, this little series had the power to make defenses worry about the width of the field, and then make them pay when they rallied too strongly to the sweep. The real beauty, and what Red loved to do, was the Play Action Passes and Screens off this action.


To wrap up this article, we will look at Red’s best play action pass (Popcorn Pass), and then some of the screens he would throw off it.


Gangster



Rocket motion, fake the trap, and boot to the smash route. Very much like an inverted Buck waggle. This was a simple play, yet with defensive secondary concerned with filling the alley on Rocket, it was a highly productive part of the playbook.


Another important difference between Mouse and Red was in protection. On Popcorn Pass, 7 blockers stayed in. Red also had an 8-man protection call “Everybody Block” (love it). With the ability to utilize more than just the 6-man protection Mouse and his heirs utilize, Red was not merely providing more protection for his quarterback, he was preparing to ATTACK the blitz.


The Superback screen in Mouse’s version of the run and shoot is deadly. One of those ‘just when you think you have everything covered’ type of plays. Everything looks like roll-out (60/61 protection), and then the OL releases up field and the FB curls around for the dump off screen. It is just so easy to discount a skill player staying in to pass protect.


Spread-SlipScreen


That’s right, I went there……


What Red added was the ability to manufacture multiple screen looks (off roll and play action), using multiple screen men (FB and slots), while keeping it simple with one screen scheme (the OL just had ‘screen left’ and ‘screen right’). Again, it is so easy to ignore an offensive skill player tied up in protection, especially with so many moving pieces (rocket, trap, play action pass) going on around you.


In the Popcorn Pass diagram, you can see how easy it would be to slip screen the FB to the left, and also how easy it would be to slip screen the slot who stayed in to block to the right. Some of the biggest gainers in Franklin College history have come off simple dump offs to a screen man with a wall of undersized, but willing to cut block their grandmother down, offensive linemen in front.


I’m not advocating one style of run and shoot over the other. However, I cut my teeth on Red’s run and shoot attack; the offense and the man holds a special place in my heart.


Red Faught passed away during my sophomore season at Franklin College. I, along with 90 other players, attended his funeral in our game jerseys….each of us also wore a plain red baseball cap. Red always wore one on the sidelines, despite the fact Franklin’s school colors are blue and gold (I loved that about him). Obviously, that is why people called him “Red”. I had the pleasure of speaking to him a few times, and that philosophy to “go reckless and stay loose” (which Ellison coined and Red so ardently advocated) applies as much to football as it does life.


“Balance?! Hell, pass!”


Right on Coach Faught, right on.

Saturday, April 23, 2011

Video Dump



Exciting match between France and Serbia Under 19 years old teams. Winner is qualified for the U19 European Championshio in Spain this summer:


http://www.dailymotion.com/TeamRadiOSSA#videoId=xi9rwt


FYI: France is a longtime Wing-T team, now playing some wing / veer offense.


FYI2: French RB #28 and French DB #31 are Julien's players.



Some practice clips of Holgorsen practice #1 (from Houston)










Resurgence of Mike Vick


Here is a capture of two performances for comparison
Vs Chicago (under pressure from behind)




Vs Indianapolis (in a close shootout)





Sunday, April 3, 2011

Altering Post Snap Tempo

Much ado has been made of the importance of tempo in modern football.


ept_sports_ncaaf_experts-765833194-1254415226 Nowadays, it is less about what you are doing (option, power, air raid), and more about HOW you do it (huddle, different tempos, crazy fast).


The reasons why one goes no huddle are well versed. The main reason, as we have learned from our basketball counterparts, is to control the tempo of the game. The offense sets the pace, and whatever the philosophy, CONTROLLING that pace is a decided offensive advantage.


While some live in extremes (see Oregon), most teams find value in altering the tempo, either to the specific situation (2:00 time or kill clock time), or to simple prevent the defense from “settling in”. Like placing defenders in run/pass binds, attacking multiple areas along the LOS, and vertically and horizontally stretching zone droppers, varying tempo is just another way to make a defense stress, and ultimately, to break.


Freaking-Out


The point is, if you aren’t up on varying your pre-snap tempo, you need to be.


While this article is about POST snap tempo, it was necessary to talk through the philosophy and importance of pre-snap tempo in order to appreciate how post snap variance is also vital.


I’m going to use the offense I know as an example, but this is applicable to every system.


For our purposes, I want to examine two mainstays in the shotgun spread: zone read and flash screen.


The zone-read was the revolution of the past decade. By adding an option control on the backside of IZ, shotgun teams found they could run the football as well as their pro-style counterparts. Nowadays, a 6 man box is not in and of itself enough to keep a 10 personnel team from running the football.


The “ride and decide” meshing between the QB and RB creates a certain stimulus, to which the defense must react.


P_White_Zone_Read


Your “reaction” defenders (namely, LB’s and DB’s) must maintain gap integrity while diagnosing and discerning who has the football. By it’s nature, the zone read takes time to develop. While defensive pressure can disrupt other running plays, zone blocking was designed to be gap sound and prevent penetration. In general, the BIG plays on zone read (and zone in general) come when a defense starts acting (aka, poking and hoping), rather than reacting. The very nature of option football also takes advantage of flying around without purpose.


So, the best reaction (post snap) is to fit into your run responsibility, diagnose whom the ball carrier is, and THEN rally to him.


A heavy zone read team will get a defense into this type modus operandi within a couple series.



Our second play, flash screens, do so much for a spread team.


ept_sports_ncaaf_experts-975729872-1225470402


Beyond the purposes of this post, perimeter screens force defenses to occupy and play in space (must line up properly), and are easy ways to get the ball to an athlete (like Crabtree).


For the purposes of this article, they are also a great way to vary that post snap “ride and decide” stimulus of the zone read, of which the defense just got a steady diet.


Essentially, a flash screen has the same run fits as sweep, it just threatens about twice as fast.


So, we have moved from a play that requires a defense to be gap responsible and react slowly, to a play that demands they get there NOW! After a steady diet of either stimulus, the defense will be less ready (less conditioned) to handle the other, simply by virtue of having altered their post snap decision-making process.


I’m gonna call on my dogs to explain this a little more.


The bell rings, I get food.


The bell rings, I get food.


The bell rings, I get food.


The bell rings, I get food.


The bell rings, I get food.


The bell rings, I get food.


The bell rings, I get food.


The bell rings….Hey, where did all this slobber come from?


THE BIG POINT:


The analogy of a boxer has been used to describe many things as it pertains to offensive play calling, and we can now add helping to relate the idea of post snap tempo to the list.


A boxer switches between short jabs and big hooks/cross/uppercuts for many reasons. You pound (weaken) with your jabs. You get an opponent use to defending jabs, then, at the opportune moment, you throw one of the other aforementioned strikes to do real damage.


For our purposes, these strikes also compliment each other in the manner (speed and position) in which strike. Throw nothing but jabs, and you might as well be tickle fighting a real boxer, but when you can mix it up, changing the speed and position of the assault, your opponent can’t find a rhythm.


In football terms, keeping a defense “off rhythm” is the name of the game.

Wednesday, March 30, 2011

Unity of Apparent Intent

The following is a synopsis of what I consider the finest, free playbook on the internet:



The%20Wild%20Bunch%20Wallpaper%201


Ted Seay (who, despite our never having met, has influenced me greatly) now has this gem in it’s 4th edition (available here). Schematically, 10/20 personnel Wing-T that combines series based runs with modern horizontal and vertical stretches is my cup of tea. Even if it is not your brand of football, I stand by my sentiment that EVERYONE concerned with offensive football should read this document.


In particular, as feeble an attempt as it may be, I would like to review Mr. Seay’s concept of “unity of apparent intent” (UAI). My intention is certainly not to add to this idea, nor do I trust I can adequately rehash it. My hope is to relay enough information that your interest is peaked and you will do yourself the service of reading about the “side order of football”.


WHAT IT IS…


The UAI is all about deception, a key component of the Wild bunch offense (and every other scheme). Starting at page 154 of the linked document, Mr. Seay artfully ties military strategy with football philosophy, creating his theory of attack as it pertains to offensive football. Again, go read the document for this valuable insight, as the scope of Mr. Seay’s theory (The Tao of Deception) is another article in and of itself. For now, I want to focus on what this means from a series based approach.


Creating conflict, in its most simple form, involves attacking a defender’s over reaction to a base play.


Curl-Flat


The above diagram is a crude drawing of the curl-flat concept, where by the Flat Defender ($) is placed in a no-win situation. He can either cover the out route and allow the Curl to materialize behind and inside of him, or he can sink to the curl and give up the easy throw to the out.


It is a typical 2 on 1 stretch that many offensive passing concepts seek to create, and unless the flat defender receives help from one of his teammates, the only thing stopping the offense from running curl-flat all the way down the field is a lack of offensive execution.


So here is what happens:


The cornerback (C) will only allow 10 yards completions happen right in front of him for so long before he starts playing the curl (instead of his deep 1/3 responsibility). Attacking overreaction (cheating of assignment, over aggression, etc.) is what series based play calling/offensive structure is all about.


Curl-Wheel


Another crude drawing, but the wheel tag is an excellent way to attack a CB who is jumping curl routes. Essentially, we are attacking the primary responsibility of a player who has abandoned it in favor of “plugging the dike” somewhere else.


So, that is a simple example of what we mean generally by “creating conflict”. The UAI, however, is about the details. It’s about making Y’s out and wheel routes stem the exact same way. When two things look the same, but end up attacking a defensive in ways that are not only different, but in fact complimentary, then you have developed the unity of apparent intent to your advantage.


Imagine the CB has a great position coach….one who is determined to make cover 3 work against this little curl-flat with the wheel tag package. He decides to teach his CB to key #2 (Y) in his backpedal. He notices that on Curl flat, Y will vertical stem his route before breaking it hard to the flat. On the Wheel, however, Y will stem straight toward the sidelines and start to veer up field.


So, if Y stems vertical, then the CB has the ability to press the curl…….if Y immediately releases to the flat, then the CB knows he must play the wheel. The pattern of an offensive player’s movement tells the defender where he needs to be.


When it comes to making offensive decisions about “how do we run this route”, etc., this must be in the forefront of the play designer’s mind. Routes need to stem the same way (and runs need to look the same too) in order to keep the defense in a state of confusion/uncertainty. When an offense eliminates cues as to their intention, thereby gaining UAI, the offense functions far more efficiently.


For Mr. Seay, this culminated in how he blocked Fly sweep and the FB compliment off it for his Wild bunch.


Coming from a Wing-T background, Mr. Seay’s original version had pulling OG’s on the sweeps. After much study, he finally decided to switch to zone blocking everything.


The result is a truly UNREADABLE offensive series that starts with Jet Sweep (with OZ blocking). The compliment is the front side IZ run with the FB, which Mr. Seay’s research has shown actually averages more yards per call than the sweep. The OL movement and backfield mechanics look EXACTLY the same on both plays, leaving defenders without a reliable visual key.


We talked about curl-flat and Jet Sweep series, but this concept needs to be built into everything you do, regardless of your offense flavor.


Obviously the ability to execute is paramount, but winning football games against good competition comes down to details. That guy running the Jet needs to move at the same pre-snap speed and purpose whether he is getting the ball or not. We can’t cheat initial movements too much (though a little may be advisable in certain situations), and especially if we do not have a GOOD REASON for it.


Again, great stuff from Mr. Seay.



NEW NOTE:


I appreciate the comments.


Per Mr. Seay's invitation, here is a link to some new WB material:


http://www.scribd.com/doc/25907198/Wild-Bunch-5-0-2010


Enjoy it.......I know I will!

Thursday, December 9, 2010

Battle of the Boards (Auburn / Oregon)

As we all anticipate what should be an exciting match up between two explosive offenses in Auburn and Oregon for the National Championship, we may be able to glean some useful lessons from both these teams. Both represent fast-paced no-huddle offenses that are borrowing on basic concepts and adapting them as the lastest offensive innovation. Ironic or fittingly, I suppose, that we covered both teams offenses earlier in the Fall (Oregon / Auburn), but what stands out to most people about each is not their plays or scheme so much, as their method of operation...................fast. In this post, we will provide some insight into how one of these teams facilitates this tempo via sideline signal boards.


While it has garnered quite a bit of attention (and favor) with the BooYah Sports Network by featuring their self-heralded icons during Oregon games, Auburn's similar practice has been rather subdued. Both essentially share the system of communication, along with other offenses (Oklahoma State).

It may appear as complex chaos, the methodology is quite simple. You have a base offense and concepts that you run, all you are doing is eliminating the unnecessary huddle and parsing the relevant pieces of information needed on a given play. The no-huddle concept has been around for a while, but recently it has undergone more efficient tweaking, accentuating the irrelevance of the huddle. If you've ever spent anytime coaching offense, you'll know just how tedious and frustrating it can be dicking around "coaching" the huddle procedure ('YOU go here...you go there....no, no, no...you're supposed to face that way!").

To better explain this process, I've included examples of how this information would be coded and signaled to flesh out how it actually works. Lets explore what needs to be delivered to the players....

Formation
Motion
Play direction
Play Type

This is common information usually shared in the huddle, before anything is presented to the defense. What the no-huddle is doing is presenting a formation, allowing the defense to match it, then call an offensive play based on this information and/or change it (if necessary). All this can be accomplished outside the confines gathering the players together; just line up, get the play, and execute it.

How information is being communicated (the huddle is a waste of resources)

As the offense nears the spot, they will assume the same formation as the last play (though nothing really changes for the offensive line, quarterback, and fullback on most every play). The formation will be signaled (usually by a sideline player) as soon as the previous play ends along with any pre-snap movement until that formation is achieved. Next, the play type will be given to the players. The quarterback will begin the cadence, repeating the playside/series code, and snap the ball. Once the play ends, the next begins and the process repeats.

This necessitates an offense to develop its own language, with multiple terms (and signals) to deliver the same information, so the code cannot be easily ‘cracked’. This is achieved by concept association and by allowing the position units to devise the terms they want to use (ownership of association).

Sideline Communication
The sideline usually features up to four different signalers consisting quarterbacks, receivers, graduate assistants, assistant coaches, and coordinators. These players will be signaling something every down, though not every signaler will be ‘live’ (will be signaling bogus dummy calls). The common method is broken down as follows;

Play Caller: coordinator / coordinator assistant
Signaler: position coach (runs, play action, screens)
Color: player (black or blue = right / white or gold = left / red = play change/check)
Signal Board: GA (passes)

All these individuals will present their signals to the on-field players until the ball is snapped to ensure that no player did not receive the information. So once a play ends, the 'next play' begins with the entire offense setting up on the spot of the ball, looking to their sideline for new information.

The real key to the team of signalers is the Color designator. Colors will determine if the signaler is hot (or the board is hot) as well as reinforce what the playside will be.

Black, White, Green, Pink, Brown – Signaler is Hot
Blue, Gold, Red – Board is Hot

So by this example, after a formation is given and the sideline player signaling “Black” (right is playside / signaler is hot) the players on the field will look to the signaler for the play. If the color signaler is delivering “Blue”, they can understand that the playside is right and the board is hot (i.e. pass routes) and disregard the signaler.

To better explain this process, I've included examples of how this information would be coded and signaled to flesh out how it actually works. Let’s explore what needs to be delivered to the players....


As you can see by the charts above, the no-huddle concept of signaling can deliver this information quickly through association and will generally only affect the 5 specialists on offense.

Next, the play type (run, play action, screen, or pass) can be delivered. The key is to group the play type by genus or series.

“If the reference is X, I will know that the play is going to be ‘this type’, now all I need to know is which one”

In our examples we can classify the play types as;
Runs are represented by NFL teams (or mascot)
Passes are represented by College teams (or mascot)
Play action passes will be represented by the run action signal with a (color) tag
Screens are based off locations (city or state)

We saw this earlier (and it is quite common) during the write-up on Louisiana Tech’s first few practices last spring as well as Bo Pelini’s base defense concepts, where commonly used categories represent different types of plays.

Take these examples for instance;
I=draws the association of “I for IZ” that is commonly tied to the NFL team, Indianapolis Colts, so any horse reference would be able to convey a zone run.

P=draws the association of “P for Power” (i.e. NFL team with a ‘P’ is the Patriots), so all you would have to do is deliver an iconic symbol of what people would associate a ‘patriot’ with.

During this entire process, the quarterback can eyeball the sideline while ‘translating’ audibly to the line and backs…. “Blue, Blue….Cowboy! Cowboy!” (right counter) without the defense really having any idea of what is going on. Alternatively, the very next play could be called “Black, Blue….Dallas! Dallas!”, and still be running the same play.

With passing plays, it is the same process, but this is where the boards come in. If the board is 'hot', the bogus play type will be called out and let the offensive line know it is not run-action, so they will need to listen for the protection. The fullback will then call out a play-specific protection on every down (much like the TFS system will have the back make a 'roger' / 'louie' call each play).

When the board is ‘hot’ the quadrants will represent primary and secondary receiver routes based on the route tree used. So, you could have your passing concepts represented by both associations (NCAA teams/mascots deliver a passing concept) as well as number representations (“20” / “97”). See below for a standard chart for passing concepts and marry them up with the included passing tree.

If you are calling a smash concept, you could just call "Razorback" (Arkansas) or the "20" (or "90"). The "2" in this call would represent the initial read side (right) and the "0" indicates primary receiver running the hitch.

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