Overcoming the Advantage of Run-Pass Option Offenses

Much has been made of the advancements of offenses in this 'modern age' of football.  There are endless articles on these new spread plays, but what of the defense? What can a defense do to not only adapt but limit the seemingly endless advantages of these offenses?  

Defending Uptempo: Circle The Wagons

"The thing I wonder about is that if you play offense like that, then that's how you practice. You have to practice like that, so how do you really ever coach defensive players? If a guy doesn't play the right technique, you're going up and telling him and showing him how to play that block or whatever.

But, hell, they're running another play.

All you're trying to do is get lined up [on defense],

You can't play specialty third-down stuff. 

You can't hardly scheme anything. 

The most important thing is to get the call so the guys can get lined up, and it's got to be a simple call. The offense kind of knows what you're doing."

>>this is another collaborative post with hemlock<<

PREVIOUS COMMENTARY


Nick's unnerved at the thought of losing control of the game, despite the fact that his system provides as sound of an approach for preparing players for dealing with the realities of spread football as any.  He's still saying that the NCAA should do something to slow offenses down because it takes all of the adjustments and special schemes that coaches create out of the game. 

Coaches, not just fans are having a hard time dealing with this.  Moreover, unlike the wishbone and what not, this is probably not going anywhere.  For a number of reasons the uptempo attack s probably here to stay.  

Case in point, using this year's Texas A&M and Alabama game, with the assumption that A&M came out with guns firing, giving it their best shot in the first half and the second half pretty much was determined and the game took an entirely different direction.  Taking a look at the 36-something offensive snaps (19 1st & 10s) A&M had between the 10s (wiping the goal line scenarios), just to see how Bama was going to play them and what A&M was after.....

3x1 and 3x2 83% of the snaps

pressuring 3x2 45% of the time and 3x1 31%

A great example of this chess match was evidenced in the first series of A&M.  A&M starts in 3x2 then motions into the formation, for which a rote response from a Saban defense (automatic against 3x2 motion) would be "Razor - Check 1 Funnel", where the weak safety rolls back to deep hole player and move the backside linebacker inside as the rat.  Coach Sumlin used this to setup the counter with Manziel for an explosive gain. 

The next week versus Ole Miss, Bama was sitting in Cover 6 to the field (a standard approach a vertical threat).  Ole Miss did a good job with tempo, and while we could go deep into the minutiae of these matchups, there were many occasions where it all boiled down to man to man coverage ("play ball") so all the scheming that Bama intended, wasn't going to help.  Even though the results were less than expected, it becomes apparent how out of their element the Bama defense can be when forced to into a situation as fast as Ole Miss was presenting.  Of course, this speaks to the tactical advantage of uptempo but should support the investment needed in your defensive players to handle formations with cookie-cutter answers.  This has to be clear through the depth chart (everyone on the roster), so there's where coaching / teaching comes into play.    

By in large, the answer to "how to handle the spread?" would be "don't change anything". The fact that Saban really did not try to conjure up something "special" seems to suggest that they've reached the limit, at least for now, of their defensive thinking. And this has been par for the course not just for Alabama, but also many of today's defenses.....stick to what you are already doing from within the system you've installed.

Addressing this new challenge really becomes a discussion on "what is coaching"? Is it getting 11 guys to follow orders or is it something more? By more, I mean teaching the game of football individually and within their player groups so that each can function autonomously, yet in unison. 

It is easy to lose focus and concentrate on how well we can rep "34 Lead, damnit!" in practice, ensuring all the kids are following orders, and call that coaching. When we settle for just that, are we really teaching the game and the intent of what we're after?  I would think we need to press further so that the players can move beyond just doing what they're told and are able to process the field to defend the ball?  When we can get there, when we can distill it down to some adaptable concepts for the players the units should be able to function on their own, and consequently, at a faster pace (both offensively and defensively).  

And so we can go back to the "Saban Method"^TM and how there is no benefit to re-scheme an opponent when you already have a framework to handle the expanse of the field you're operating in (formation vs field position).  You develop athletes to be football players and not just skilled positions.

Another limitations defenses face today (in addition to the reduction in time between snaps) is the ever evolving rule changes to ensure safety (targeting, DPI, personal fouls, etc).  Whereas, a viable solution could be to handle vertically-centered offenses with 2 Buc coverage approach, more and more it is near impossible to play with any sense of effectiveness because any hit from a defender that would be set up from playing soft zone would likely result in a first down for the offense.  What worked 10 years ago on defense, would have many of these shots being flagged today or are simply not effective because the DB is now pulling up rather than laying the guy out.  

New Metrics For Today's Defenses?

NEWS FLASH: DEFENSIVE COORDINATORS ADDED TO ENDANGERED SPECIES LIST

>>this is another collaborative post with hemlock<<

Overview and Background:

We are ten weeks into the college football season and already a highly respected defensive coordinator has been fired and the nation’s most elite unit had over half a thousand yards hung on it in one afternoon.  It would seem that offenses today must really be ahead of defenses, a thought that would seem to suggest that with time, as the offenses did in the good old bad old days, invariably catch up.  But maybe something else is at work here, something that the powers that be in the game, the Mack Browns and Nick Sabans of the world, are reluctant to admit, the possibility that the terrain upon which the game is played has so radically shifted that the old benchmarks according to which defenses were once measured simply no longer apply.  Put differently, holding an offense to 300 / game is just not a realistic goal when two teams of similar talent take the field.  With this in mind, what, then, broadly speaking, should be the goals for defenses in the age of the spread and how should they go about trying to achieve them in an increasingly frenetic, hostile, and strained environment?

It would be easy to turn this piece into something of a eulogy for Manny Diaz and scathing critique of Mack Brown.  Readers of this blog know that we respect Coach Diaz and thus, for that matter, by logical extension, know that we view the situation developing in Austin as being a classic example of the “you reap the seeds you sow” whirlwind.  The fact of the matter is that against today’s increasingly efficient and streamlined spread offenses defense as traditionally played, evaluated, schemed, and executed is no longer feasible.  Monte Kiffin returned to the NFL not just because he wanted to buoy his son on another year, but because he wanted to coach in a league without Oregon, UCLA, Cal, Arizona State, and Arizona; little did poor Monte know when he fled for Dallas that he’d have to face Chip Kelly.  Oh, well.

But Texas is not the only place where proud defensive units with excellent personnel are getting ripped up by offenses, sometimes with younger, rawer, and less talented personnel.  Yes, Alabama won, and yes they were playing against one of the best offenses in the country, but according to virtually every metric, they played worse in Sunday’s victory than in last year’s defeat.  And what about the famed black shirts of Nebraska?  For the second year in a row they were scorched by a no-frills spread attack predicated not on trickery and chicanery but straightforward football, which is to say, a lot of inside zone (and a watered down version of that, to say the least), key screens, some verts, a new interpretation of Go Switch, and a nifty little snag game that everybody knows is coming on third down when Coach Mazzone needs to make a money call.  Oh, and don’t forget about the new and very young crew slinging their version pure blue sky up there on corners of Berkeley, freshmen and sophomores, mostly, going toe to toe  against Northwestern and Ohio State, snapping the ball over 90 times / game and averaging over 500 yards every time out.  Clearly the game is up.  What used to work is no longer applicable because not simply has the vocabulary of the game changed, but so has its very language. 

Objectives:

We will sketch here in broad strokes what we think the new metric for defense should be.  We will then, and again, in broad terms, review how some teams, such as Alabama and Nebraska, are defending spread teams this year.  Our next step will be to consider specific keys that defenses need to consider as they prepare every week.  Finally, we will suggest, perhaps controversially, that they best way to defend the spread today is to regress a little.

The New Metric:

We believe that there are five basic criteria according to which defenses today, in one form or another, must be measured.

1. Negative Yardage Plays: these plays are incredibly disruptive to up-tempo, spread outfits.  They derail them, force them into a type of safe mode that makes them slow down.
2. Limit Explosives: by this we mean, any play of twenty yards or more.  These plays are certain to elicit a NASCAR type response from an up-tempo offense, a response that can be no more complicated than inside zone, but now, with keys and quicks attached to them as automatic parts of the base play.
3. 3^rd Down: obviously, this draws heavily on the above results, but it must be accounted for.  Up-tempo teams are incredibly stripped down outfits that carry a bare minimum number of plays into a game.  What they run on 3^rd down thus should be painfully evident.  Like the Huskers of yesteryear, the Bruins today have a very finite number of things they run on 3^rd down. 
4. What you can live with: This is essentially a supplement to point 3 that deals with the multi-faceted element of every play today.  Virtually all teams tag quicks and screens to everything they run.  The question is, then, what can you live with getting beat by and what you absolutely cannot tolerate.
5.  Limit scores / settle for FGs: When Mike Leach was at Texas Tech his defenses under Ruffin McNeil were none as fairly vanilla units, basic match-zone stuff that brought very little heat.  This was by design for Leach’s goal was to turn the game into a duel of possessions.  Confident that his unit would score touchdowns more often than not the goal on defense was to either minimize the possessions of the opposition or to create more possessions for his own offense through turnovers and stalled drives.  In a way, this is what Tommy Spangler tried to do at LaTech, something his units were often successful at when healthy.  

cCONTINUED HERE

Unconstipated efficiency

Instead of assessing and fooling the entire defense, 

trying to ensure you have the absolute perfect play called,

just eliminate the big picture, 

attack one defender and get after it

Yep - another damn Tony Franklin post! 
Louisiana Tech's Offensive Coordinator is a finalist for the 2012 Broyles Award  (along with Noel Mazzone, Blake Anderson, Calvin Magee and Kliff Kingsbury) and also for footballscoop.com's Offensive Coordinator of the Year.

The 2012 Bulldogs are #1 in scoring offense, #1 in total offense, #1 in red zone efficiency, and #3 in explosive plays.  This is coming after starting two freshmen running backs and losing last year's main quarterback. The item we would like to stress in this post is that what Franklin is doing at Tech is NOT complicated.  In fact, it is the opposite of complex and is an antithesis of the ego and stubbornness most of us associate with "coaching".  There is no secret play they are running, no magic scheme, no spectacular players manufacturing Herculean performances.  As a side note, what makes Sonny Dykes such a bad ass at La Tech is that after getting the job in 2010, he retained the staff of Derek Dooley, bringing in Franklin, Rob Likens, and Zach Yenser.  He still has this staff with him today.

What we hope to accentuate, using Franklin's latest stop as a case study, are the connections that are driving the success of many of today's BCS second-tier schools (UCLA, Texas A&M, Louisiana Tech, etc).

We documented several variations in 2010 when Dykes and Franklin first arrived, noting that much had changed from the founding cannon of air raid. After a breakout season in 2011, Franklin is sharpening his arsenal into an even more dynamic attack. Noting what has changed, what has been streamlined, what is 'missing' will ultimately impress upon you the reason WHY they are doing it; SPEED.  

 

No more quick game (save for 68 and 66), no more mesh, very little shallow, hardly any verticals..... everything is perimeter-focused with 94 (Sail) / 98 (Out) with a handful of tags, 41/51, zone and counter.

 
Their practice sessions start with high-intensity position work with Dawgzilla pounding out a hip hop soundtrack to keep everyone loose and moving.  Next period is inside drill and 1-on-1s that amount to ultra-competitive sessions of concepts (two receivers and two quarterbacks running against two defenders simultaneously). This translates to a high number of reps for all players using routes and techniques you will be using in team period.  Each practice amounts to a furious race to get to Team time, where they relentlessly attack one another in competition.  It's all scripted, and according to Franklin, he's just "running plays (to see what will work)" to assess the capacity of his offense (what works, what doesn't).  He attests to there not being a real clear methodology behind the play calls, much of it shooting from the hip.  Of all the ground covered in practice, the one absolute is reinforcing their tempo. They never huddle on offense or defense and most plays fire off with only 9-10 seconds of lag, but when they start the "Attack" tempo, there is no let-up. After a decent gain, the offense will begin the attack tempo and not relent until there is a score or inevitable punt (often times pushing the 4th and manageable). Even against a defense designed to handle no-huddle, that makes few checks or calls, after 4-6 attack tempo plays the defense will be left with few answers and be on the ropes.  As you see here, they are just running through plays, correction will be done on film later, similar to how you would run a basketball practice.

They teach concepts, so all that is needed is each position receive its 'play' from the sideline via signals with five coaches signalling one position (inside receivers, outside receivers, Oline, Back, QB).  They signal (often times yelling it as well) the formation right after a play ends, then begin the process of just queuing their position on the next play.  This delivers the info extremely quick when they are in "attack".  One thing I would also encourage is using a hyper speed like Blake Anderson, where a series of plays is already scripted/known, so there is nothing to signal or tell a player (1st play is ___, 2nd play is____, 3rd play is _____).  


It is interesting to note where this is coming from and how it becomes such an irritation to many old school thinkers.  So much has been done over the years to reduce the risk on offense through established reads, formationing, personnel groupings.  This works, but eventually all defenses will catch up with the trend.  

It got so, particularly in the last decade that defenses could be compartmentalized into special classifications (goal line, 1st down, nickel, 3rd and short, etc) because by and large offenses were painting themselves into these situational corners.  In a given situation, you could just run down a tendency list and check off all the concepts that would not apply to your down and distance (based on personnel, then by formation, etc). For as much thought and planning went into those offenses, it just became a shell game, a target based on probability for defenses.  Coaches became known for being academic, card-counting project managers moreso than teaching football.  While this all still matters, the current trend is pushing offensive production (and tradition) to challenge this way of life.  I'll also note that no-huddle is nothing new, I recall getting quick counted from a no-huddle wing-t offense in the 80's. What we are seeing from Tech and TAMU is the efficiency to operate at this pace (and to do so means carrying very little into a game).

Back in 2005 - 2007, many of the air raid teams of Holgerson, Franklin, and Brewer would attempt to combat situational-driven defenses through freeze-check.  This allowed the coordinator to eliminate the huddle and find the most logical play call based on what the defense was showing.  We have seen this mature to the point of dual-play combinations (slow screen + 5-step pass / fast screen + run) since 2007 where you can freeze check and still make the right call even if you don't get the look you expect.  These offenses would run at NASCAR tempo as an opportunist tactic.  In the past few seasons, teams are operating at this tempo (and faster) for the entire game with the premise of taking as many shots at the end zone as possible and eliminate lulls in the game where an opponent has the opportunity to reset their "situational awareness". This creates a two-fold dynamic; your offense is capable of burying an opponent in a point deficit and you can eliminate the notion that your opponent could exact that same philosophy on you (reference the Texas A&M game against Louisiana Tech).  So for an offense, as long as you prevent negative yardage plays and can consistently execute, rushing through a series only helps the offense.  The faster the offense operates, the less effective a defense premised to defend personnel, down and distance, hash, and formation is.  When a defense is left in this type of environment, stunting and blitzing become ineffectual - teeing off on known offensive probabilities no longer is available. 

 "You miss all the shots you don't take" - Wayne Gretzky

As we wrote about in 2010, so much of the air raid repertoire was pared down, stripped for simplicity.  I believe we are at a point now where offenses are dropping even more for the sake of increasing their output and out-pacing a defense.

This is best evidenced by what Franklin has been doing in the past three years.  With the exception of the offensive line, his personnel has changed every year.  The constant variables has required him to quickly assess what his players are capable of doing (even if there isn't a logical constraint within the package).  Like Alex Gibbs, Tony (and Mazzone) would've come to an awakening of removing plays that resulted in negative yardage or inconsistent production.   The following are the basic questions that would push an offense into a cycle of perpetual momentum against an opponent. 

1. If this is what we're going to become on offense, what don’t we need to keep?
2. What works? What has the highest efficiency? minimize negative yardage plays
3. Should always be about getting more numbers at the point of attack (this could be double wing, wing-t, or spread) in an isolated area (outside the hash / on the hash / between the tackles).
4. How fast can you run key screen? This HAS to a one of the easiest plays to execute and doesn’t require you to block anyone
5. Focus on plays that require the least amount of processing.  Front option / MOF read can be toyed with by defensive movement.  Deciphering the defense will only slow your offense down.
6. The more efficient the concept the faster you can play without adjusting. You'll see Tony not running much across the middle of the field, which would require a quarterback to get a clear understanding of what he is seeing (to throw Dig/Post/Shallow where a Rat would be).  This is why he’s running power, key, rodeo/lasso – it’s against very limited looks (1/3 of the field) and can work against whatever the defense could be in.
7. The more efficient at converting downs translates to more scoring opportunities
8. Gaining positive yards puts you in manageable situations to sustain drives.  You miss every shot you don’t take – the more volleys you can make the greater the odds you can score.
9. The more scores (and the threat of rapid scoring), the more one-dimensional your opponent will become.
10. The faster you play, the less a defense can adjust / change
11. The more static a defensive look, the more efficient your concepts become
12. Protection – what do you need? If you aren’t getting blitzes, you will only get 5 man pressures.  If you get 6 man pressures it can be an immediate hot throw.  This means you don’t need to involve an inconsistent back in protection….everything is 5 man protection now
13. If you only work in 5 man protection, then there are no adjustments needed from empty to 3-back, increasing the versatility of the offense through simplicity.

So that leads us to the next point of simplicity....

Protection

We reviewed how Tech distilled their blocking of identifying multiple defensive fronts to a simple 6-man protection, packaged to an odd or even front.  Fast forward two years, and gone is Roger and Louie (determining back help in protection), O-Line coach, Petey Perot, has sold-out to simplicity and has removed the back from the call (just free-release the back every down).  Recognize this?

Protection is split to a 3-man zone and 2-man most-dangerous-man side. The quarterback makes the call (Rickey / Linda), so he will know where he has the least help (where the quarterback read becomes part of the protection). This is very similar to what Mike Leach was using at Texas Tech and exactly how Noel Mazzone protects in his system (though he will use a back to pick up the hot).

This brings us back to hemlock's contention of concision versus the old guard of tradition.  How fast will these offenses be allowed to play? When Texas A&M played Alabama, the only time the game slowed down was when the officials felt the need to allow the defense ample opportunity to match substitutions.

I believe these offenses are proving not that no-huddle is the way to go, but that if you have concepts your team is competent in why provide your opponent time to prepare to foul things up? This is the appeal of no-huddle up-tempo.  It remains a valid attack for empty to double-wing and it ultimately requires little complexity, but significant competency (fundamental execution).  It also begs for self-reflection.  What can we do without, how can the game be even more simplified and reduced?  We went through this very process with the defense not long ago.

Boned!

We are now through seven weeks of the college football season and one of the more exciting matchups this season was the pairing of the prolific and aggressive paced offenses of Texas A&M and Louisiana Tech.  Much has been written on this blog about Tech, but A&M has been one of the forerunners of tempo spread since the hiring of Mike Sherman in 2008 and also through his replacement,  new head coach, Kevin Sumlin. What was interesting about this matchup was how A&M, a non-powerhouse of the Big XII and now SEC, has used this style of play to compete when they are routinely outgunned in their conference then faces a team with similar philosophy.  Both defenses were well acquainted with tempo offenses, because naturally, that is what they practice against.

This post, as well as most posts on this blog, will simply articulate a momentum or trend that happens to be current.  I doubt we're breaking much ground here, nor are we attempting to deliver some great truth or provide a how-to coaching guide.  We'll just be documenting a direction or response encountered in today's game.  It can be easy to fixate on singular items, but where we're hoping to go is tie in the relevant connections to see what's at play in the bigger picture.  We could no doubt, review some of the same efficiencies and nuances of Johnny Manziel and the TAMU offense used by Kliff Kingsbury.


Tech (and other spread offenses) has been using a 3-back formation for quite a while, but what they have been using it for in the past 8 months to compliment their base package, is something to take note of.  To accommodate their frantic pacing in games, so much of the playbook has to be trimmed and streamlined to ensure efficiency.  Tech bases out of 2x2 and 3x1, but to provide a radical change-up against the nickel defenses they see, Tech uses tight-ends and versatile backs (extra linemen more recently) to force defensive personnel into non-standard situations, primarily to elicit a coverage response.  This cat-and-mouse game was illustrated throughout the second half of this game.  In this post, we'll take a look at what kind of changes were taking place.  You'll see much of this all goes back to the early one-back philosophies.

Against one-back sets, the defense will typically commit 6 defenders to the box and play nickel with 2-high safeties.  

After pacing through a series with receivers spread the width of the field, Tech will race through substitutions and be set within 10 seconds with 3 backs in the backfield.  The defense, in the given personnel grouping they had from the last play, have to determine how this formation will be played. Typically, the nickel will join the box, but this only provides 7 defenders to 8 offensive players (excluding the quarterback). 

Do you keep the safeties deep to prevent isolation of your corners? 
Do you drop a safety to bolster your front? 

The challenge is that the offensive formation is symmetrical with no declared run strength. The offense can run any play to either side equally well.

TAMU using 7 defenders in the box

TAMU using 8 defenders in the box

TAMU using 9 defenders in the box

Once you even up your numbers in the box, Tech uses their gap-power run to overwhelm the point of attack (with OF lead), forcing a defense to drop both safeties and leave their corners one-on-one with the single-split receivers.

Part of the beauty of this is that most of it fits within what Tech would be doing out of 2x2 or 3x1.  They (used to) run a lot of Rodeo/Lasso and fast and solid screens on the perimeter (which becomes even more effective if you can bunch the defense up in the middle of the field).  So even though they bring in an extra blocker to the formation, they can do all the stuff they would be doing from their base formations.

When the one-on-one matchup is assured on the receiver, they will look to exploit it through play-action (usually a post-dig combo).  From here, the throw will be premised on the leverage the receiver has on the defender;

If outside – hit the post

If in-phase low shoulder - fade

If in-phase high shoulder – drop out

With as much as one-on-one leverage is worked by Tony Franklin and as talented as his receivers are, these become extremely high percentage throws.


** This game is a wonderful study in the current competitive equalizers from both teams (offense and defense).  Down by 27 in the first half, what other program would give license to continue rolling the dice with attack tempo? If Franklin was at any other school what are the odds of the head coach pulling the reins on his method and try to 'hold the ball' on offense (and limit the ability to mount the comeback)?  Facing the explosive running threat of Manziel, watch Tommy Spangler adjust his 'cats'/'shaver' pressures to bring 5 to control the running lanes.

This all plays into a larger theme on determining what is truly important to becoming more efficient, both on offense and defense.  We are well aware that trends in the game ebb and flow and remain cyclical, but its not as if there will be wholesale scheme changes made; merely adaptations.  Playing into Hemlock's point about Saban's method, defenses may need to be measured by new standards as the game of football adapts.   

TFS: Lulz

Tony Franklin with a rebuttal

http://www.al.com/alabamafootball/index.ssf/2012/10/tony_franklin_-_yes_that_one_-.html#incart_river_default

How has Tech won three road games already against three teams that played in bowl games last year? By outscoring almost everyone in the country by running Franklin’s offense somewhere close to perfection.

The Bulldogs are No. 11 in total offense at 523.4 yards a game and No. 3 in scoring offense at 53.2 points a game. Louisiana Tech averages more points a game than Auburn has scored combined in its four losses. The Bulldogs fired off 97 snaps in their 58-31 win over UNLV last weekend.

“That’s our No. 1 goal every week,” Franklin said. “To be the fastest team in America.”

Here’s where Franklin’s philosophical differences with Saban get good. Remember what the Alabama coach said last week in the wake of West Virginia 70, Baylor 63?

"I think that the way people are going no-huddle right now, that at some point in time, we should look at how fast we allow the game to go in terms of player safety," Saban said. “That's when guys have a much greater chance of getting hurt when they're not ready to play.”

Franklin’s response: “The most hilarious thing about the timing of those comments is anybody who watched New England play Denver (Sunday).”

Tom Brady and the Patriots, running a hurry-up no-huddle, ran off 89 snaps and set a franchise record with 35 first downs in beating the Broncos 31-21. Oh, and the Patriots are coached by one of Saban’s best buds, Bill Belichick.

“New England is the best offense in the NFL for one reason,” Franklin said. “They play like colleges do. They play no-huddle, fast-tempo, they change tempos and they do what they have to do to win. I think Belichick would probably disagree with his buddy.”

“It’s the great equalizer,” Franklin said. “People say Baylor can’t play defense. You know what? Before Art Briles got there, they couldn’t play offense, either, and they couldn’t win games. Now all of a sudden, Baylor can beat people because they can outscore people.

“Obviously if you can line up and you’ve got better players than everybody else and play great defense and eat clock and win as many games as you can, that’s a great way of playing football, too. The problem is, 95 percent of us don’t have that type of talent to do that.

“So when they fall into that trap of saying, ‘Here’s how Alabama has won championships. Here’s what we should do,’ to me, that’s the trap that Coach Saban would want everybody to fall into because, the reality of it is, he’s going to have better players most of the time.”

http://aol.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/story/2012-10-11/texas-am-vs-louisiana-tech-preview-sonny-dykes-undefeated-turnovers

“Our offensive (players) understand that if they get lined up incredibly fast,” Franklin said, “if they’re ready to snap the ball when the official puts the ball in play, their job is twice as easy.”

This is how the Bulldogs wear opponents down in the WAC and beyond. Like Illinois, which surrendered 31 straight second-half points to Louisiana Tech in a shocking 52-24 blowout in Champaign in September. Or like Virginia a week later, which gave up 34 straight points in a loss in Charlottesville.

You’ve got bigger guys than we do? More depth? Good luck getting on and off the field against our offense.

“You could see the fatigue in their players,” Cameron, a senior, said of Illinois and Virginia. “You could see it in their faces and their body language. When we see bad body language, it motivates us to play even faster.”

"Is this what we want football to be?"

Well, it was bound to happen, I knew it.  One of the coaches in football I respect the most said some truly idiotic things the other day.  As I am sure everybody who keeps tabs on this blog knows, Nick Saban, after cruising to another victory last Saturday against SEC rival Ole Miss, expressed his deep existential concern for the future of football.  Against the backdrop of the Baylor-WVU shootout, the unprecedent success of LaTech, and the slight run that Ole Miss gave the Tide the other night in Tuscaloosa, Saban rhetorically asked whether this was what we want football to be?

We all know the source of Saban's anxiety.  A defensive coach by training, Saban is disurbed by the spike in scoring that has followed the spread, no pun intended, of extreme up-tempo, spread football.  On the surface, Saban's thoughts are covered in a thin slurry about the physical safety of players.  Beneath this gruel, however, rests his real concern: the perceived "unfair" advantage that offenses now have by being able to line up and call plays from the sideline.  I say unfair because Saban's comments remind me of the rational that casinos offer for bouncing card counters.  Because someone has adapted to his environs by developing certain skills that were supposedly not in the minds of the Founders at the beginning of it all it is declared cheating and subsequently banned by the authorities that be. 

I understand why Saban is frustrated.  But it has nothing to do with player safety.  What upsets Saban so much is that the calculus of the game has changed so much so quickly.  In the interview Saban complains about how coaches can now control the game exclusively from the sidelines.  But has not this been the case since Paul Brown took play calling duties away from the quarterback?  What we're seeing now is simply the natural progression of a process that was started over sixty years ago.  

But I would say that what really bothers Saban more than anything else is not the fact that coaches can get their offenses out of bad plays and into good ones with relative ease now.  Teams have been doing that now for over 10 years, so that's old hat.  No, what pisses him off is the speed and efficiency with which teams play right now.  Let's forget Nick's night with Ole Miss because they're not even that good; as improved as they are the Rebels still have a way to go to be as efficient as Hugh Freeze's Red Wolves were last year.  Let's take LaTech, for example.  While Oregon gets all the headlines, LaTech is probably the most advanced up tempo team going today.  As readers of this blog know, we are big fans of what Tony Franklin is doing at Tech.  The reason is concision.  No team has probably dropped more from their package over the past three years than LaTech.  Watch the Virginia game if you want proof.  LaTech goes into every game with a very light package. (Just compare LaTech's package to the one UVA ran the other day and tell us whose offense is simpler)  Each game it seems lighter and lighter as they get faster and faster.  Practically gone from their package are old Air Raid staples like Mesh and Shallow.  Basically all they do is run an increasing amount of IZ tied to key screens and two or threee man games on the flanks.  When they want to get down the field they run Verticals, Sail, and Y-Cross.  What makes them go though is speed and efficiency.  Not only does  LaTech play fast but they do so with very few mistakes.  An offense that does not make mistakes is a difficult one to stop.

relevant source material

 So, why do I make such a big deal about efficiency?  Well, so much of what Saban has done over the years was born out of the need to check increasingly complex and sophisticated offenses.  The trend now is going the other way, making all of the bells and whistles you have in your package moot.  What Saban needs to do, and I'm sure he will at some point or another, is streamline his defensive system ala Tommy Spangler at LaTech.  Again, I do not wish to give the impression that we are in love with these guys, or that we think Spangler is a defensive guru of legendary proportions.  While Spangler is not a genius, he is a very smart coach who clearly has the ability to learn.  Being forced to keep pace with Franklin's offense at LaTech everyday forced Spangler to streamline his defense, making it, in effect, a no-huddle, check-with-me, self-correcting unit that, like the offense it competes against everyday, carries surprisingly little into each game.

I will close by saying that in a strange way the game is coming full circle, and maybe that is what bothers Saban so much.  The best no-huddle teams today really do not check that much any more; they simply go with what they have.  They can do this confidently because more often than not attached to every play is control concept that helps them go where the most grass is on the field.  In this sense, the game today is more like it was before Paul Brown started calling plays.  The players on the field are given a concept and are charged with making it go, leaving the coach with less and less say, something I can see being very problematic for someone like Nick Saban. 

No-Huddle Check-With-Me Defense

With as much wide-open spread and tempo offenses out there, surely there has to be a defensive solution to match this attack.  In this post, we’ll attempt to explain and explore the concepts a defense can use to take the wind out the sails of the no-huddle spread.

In today’s game, the true 2-back tight end has become rare. The order of the day has become a standard fare of 2x2 and 3x1 with a variety of 1-back run games and basic route concepts.  Huddling has become passé, passing games more prevalent and fast-strike offenses look to jump on sleeping defenses.  Again, we can distill the conversation down the basics; with only 5 offensive linemen and 1 back, the need for an 8-man front just isn’t there (you can live in split-safety with a 7 man box). When you couple that arithmetic with no tight end, now you can control the box with just 6 defenders (necessitating a nickel look) and control the receiving threats with 5 dedicated defensive backs. 

The numbers really never change up front. You can game and align how you like, but you’re going to account for those 6 offensive gaps with your linemen and linebackers. This leads us to what you are going to do against the only other formations you will see with 1-back; 2x2 and 3x1 (and its lovechild, 3x2). We’ve dealt with this before (twins coverage variations), but we’re going to attempt to take it a step further, going beyond old-school defensive adaptations and TCU’s swimming-in-vocabulary-system, to look at the practicality of using a ‘self-correcting’ nickel. 

This is something more than just looking for a blanket 'defense' solution (“ah, well we’ll just run Cover 2!”), but using a system with built-in answers for coverage/run support that adjusts on the fly.  It requires much more player indoctrination and processing up front, but once you’ve laid the framework, it can be anything you want it to be and essentially “run by itself”.  The simplicity is tied to the communication between the safety, corner and overhang player.  They communicate every snap so there leaves little room for ‘blown coverage’ (players not understanding what each other is responsible for).  Much like match-up zone basketball, it can be reduced down to multiple 3-on-2 banjo to each side of the offensive formation.

A brief outline of the benefits of moving towards this defensive system would be:

• 2 high all the time
• as many coverages as you want
• complete carry over for all defensive backs
• consistent with quarters / 2 read basics
• adjusts to all formations and splits without needing to alter alignment
• adapts per game plan
• no more zone 3 deep 3 under wait and react....jump everything aggressive like banjo

Coverage is premised on playing man (after distribution), but with a quarters feel; each side independent of the other.  The Strong Safety and Nickel travel to the passing strength / field, while the Sam and Free Safety align away / boundary.  All routes are intended to be aggressively matched with a banjo principle and as such, there is no spot-dropping.  This plays into how pressures will be run.  The traditional 3 deep / 3 under fire zones, with underneath defenders dropping to areas without aggressively jumping receiver distribution only creates more opportunities for the offense to find the voids.  Whereas in the late 90’s and early part of 2000s, defenses could just provide a +4 to a side pressure and overwhelm protection.  The area drops sufficed at that time.  In today’s game, offenses have more protection alternatives available, more streamlined concepts with built-in rush routes, and quarterbacks are becoming better suited to handle the blitz.  This is why aggressively matching (it looks like true man coverage when executed) is where more and more defenses are headed to.

By packaging your defense into fronts and coverage, there is no need to huddle. Your personnel can just line up for the next play based on the ball spot.  The front / game can be signaled from the sideline if necessary.  Coverage can be signaled but most times it is decided by each safety once the offense sets the formation.  The check-with-me is controlled by each safety, who will coordinate with his corner and nickel/backer on how to handle the receiver split they face.  Each side will act independently of the other. The secondary aligns in the same 2-high look for every snap, with corners inside #1, cocked inside facing the ball.  This position allows them to easily get a hand-gesture-signal by his safety, acknowledge it, and be ready for the play.  The no-huddle check-with-me allows the players more time to receive more information from the sideline (personnel) and anticipate what the offense will likely do in this down and distance once the formation is set.  You can establish some basic principles and work the exceptions based on game plan.
Now, let’s take a look at various ways the check-with-me coverage works against formations…... 

2x2 – So How Do You Handle Twins?
That depends – there are host of possibilities available, but the best way to look at this is how the offensive threat changes based on known variables.  This deductive method for packaging the coverage helps indoctrinate players to how they need to understand/process offenses.  As a footnote, I’ll mention that much has been explained about Rip/Liz from a 1-high coverage as a way of adjusting to spread.  However, this was created as a necessary adaptation for the time.  Despite leading the innovation for a decade, Saban rarely uses it.  In numerous seasons worth of film dating back to 2002, I was only able to locate a handful where Saban actually used true Rip/Liz against 2x2.  Why? Because he (like most defenses of today) remain 2-high every snap.
 
The illustrations here will display scheme with zones, simply to represent the banjo concept of denoting the route the defender will attack.  We will use basic terminology (it doesn't matter how you call the adjustment, just make sure there is a way to communicate the idea) as much as we can to explain each situation.  I'll say that NONE OF THIS is all that revolutionary (its been done since the 80s when teams were double calling their coverage based on pro/slot), but it does set a framework to begin building the concept of a no-huddle defense that can call its own plays.  As a preface to this discussion, please reference this post on coverages ( basic coverages ).

Field / Boundary

Facing 2 quicks to the field creates some horizontal spacing issues.  With really only 3 defenders to cover a 35 yard swath, you will need some creativity and flexibility to put numbers in your favor.  To the wide side of the field, you could drop the safety to cover this horizontal stretch, with a modified version of the old Robber coverage.  Here the safety will be force on run-action to him and jump the first threat outside.  The Nic will have help outside and maintain inside leverage on #2 and fit the alley in run support.  Since the Nic will be used in outside blitzes frequently, offenses can never really be sure what his alignment represents.  The Strong Safety will drop on 8-10 yard curl and cut outside breaks of #1 or #2.

With limited space into the boundary, the horizontal stretch of the coverage just isn't there.  You may see more leveled routes (China/Smash).  To the short side of the field, the preferred call is “Sink” or what amounts to 2 read (we called this 'monster' at my last stop).  The corner will carry a vertical of #1 and retreat to the deep flat if #2 appears (out).  The Strong Safety is in position to match #2 vertical.  The backer (Sam) will wall #2 on the receiver's stem.  On run action, safety is primary run force with corner over the top.  2 Read / Sink can be played on either side, but is particularly effective against flat/curl types of throws.

Back To / Away

Having a coverage preference based on field position is logical because you want to protect against getting leveraged.  You can also incorporate how you would like to adjust based on where the single back sets to account for likely route/run pairings.  

• Back away: stretch/power, back flare
• Back to: speed option

Naturally, with a back offset to the twins side, you end up with a potential threat of three receivers.  With passing strength set toward the back, in addition to running Robber explained above, you could opt to cloud (corner force) that side to include an immediate perimeter defender, expecting quick 3-man game.

With the back away from the passing strength you won't be threatened with being outnumbered immediately on the perimeter (still have a 3-on-2 advantage). An efficient way of using personnel would be to declare 'buzz', allowing the Nic to be the force defender (buzz = backer force) with the safety dropping in late to the curl/alley.  This also is a solid alternative into the boundary.

At any point, if the split is wide enough between #1 and #2 where the safety doesn't feel he can provide deep over-the-top help on #1, he has the ability to make a "swim" call that denotes that he will take #2 man-to-man.  This leaves the corner with no deep help and will be man on #1 for anything other than an immediate inside route.  This prevents being out-leveraged by #1 and #2 (works like MEG in Cover 7) but also provides a confusing change-up because the the safety exclusively matches #2 everywhere.

Another change-up that remains consistent with the relationship split-field personnel is dropping a safety into the middle of the field hole as a box player.  This is particularly effective against 2-back sets when the linebackers will be bubbled in 50 techniques (versus a single-split the corner will likely be in man coverage, anyway).  With a pro formation you'd be fine dropping both safeties outside (ala Sky) or try something else.  Here we call this "Zebra", but you can name it as you like.  The point is without a need for 3-on-2 outside based on formation, the deep safety may be better suited added to the box for run-support gap integrity. 

3x1 – You’re Only Left With One Coverage To Play Against Trips
The standard quarters answer to 3x1 was always to man the single-split and zone combo the 3-man side.  Here, we'll provide some more alternatives to this with zone matchups that will play into the field area packaging.  

Another way to play 3x1 is with “Stump” where the the corner mans #1 completely and #2 and #3 receivers are banjoed by the inside defenders (Nic, Strong Safety, and Mike).  This is particularly useful when #1 is considerably detached from the other receivers (much like "swim" outlined above). 

"Stick" is the alternative to Stump, where #3 is manned up and there remains a 3-on-2 with #1 and #2.  This is particularly effective against quick game out of trips and bubbles by #3. The Mike provides support to cut the 1st crosser of #1 or #2.

Another way to handle automatic coverage against 3x1 is with pressure.  This is best introduced from empty...

3x2 – The Rules Hold True
After already establishing how you want to play 3x1 and 2x2, these ground rules help establish a base look to stay sound against empty.  When facing a quarters defense, you can expect to see coverage rolled to the passing strength.  The standard answer against trips is to solo the backside single-receiver and end up with some type of banjo concept to the 3 receiver side.  For many defenses this is really the only solution and when faced with 3x2 empty, conventional wisdom zones everything to play it safe or go-for-broke and bring man-free pressure.

To deviate from these basic standards you would want to be able to break from conventional expectations (offenses going to trips for the purpose of getting single coverage on a receiver), but also be flexible to adjust against motion and/or passing strength changes. Previously, we discussed how the fire zone would handle trips and empty, for a more aggressive method we can flip these rules on their head.

Man Side Becomes Zone Side
The trick with no-huddle defense is always giving a static pre-snap look so an offense never really knows what it is dealing with.  Even when safeties drop, you still won’t be sure what coverage it is until the receivers are into their break.  The same holds true here for empty.

With "MASH" (Mike and Sam blitz), the 3-man side will man-free each receiver (Corner, Nic, Strong Safety).  To the 2-man side, they will banjo zone the split (often times this is going to be to the boundary) between the Corner, Mike, and Free Safety.  Corner takes first to the flat, Mike takes second out.  It all boils down to a read on #2 as to how the receiver distribution will play out (again, consistent with quarters/2 read principles).  Meanwhile, the backer away from the zone side will be a part of the 5-man pressure up front.

Empty to 3x1

This pressure also works against 3x1 or the likely shift of the the weak slot to the backfield.  If 3x2 becomes 3x1, you still have the 3-man side manned up, but if there is no immediate inside vertical threat weak, then the Mike is now included in the pressure and the Free Safety drops to replace his ‘zone’.  The Free Safety will cut the first crosser with no deep help.  Nothing really changes here, the Mike just gets replaced by the safety.

With a back in the backfield, the End away from the Free Safety will peel if the back cross releases (to the 3-man side) in an effort to help coverage.

Empty to 2x2

In the event that 3x2 becomes 2x2, likely from one of the trips side receivers shifts to the backfield, you end up with a push.  With a back in the backfield, you have a trigger to engage the Mike in the pressure (both linebackers are blitzing).  Now the only thing to figure is where the back offsets to.  The side the back sets to weighs the twins to his side as the 3-man side.  In the ‘flipped’ example below, the back sets to the former weak passing strength.  The former passing strength (to the Nic side) has shifted away, therefore the 2-man side to the Nic is now the zone-side.  The Free Safety’s side is now the passing strength with the back added to his side.  This now becomes the man-side.   The corner and Free Safety man #1 and #2 and the remaining back will be fiddled between the same-side Mike (if back releases to the Free) and the away-side DE (if back cross releases to the Nic).

An additional change up against empty is to use a Tampa 2 coverage with the Nic retreating to the deep-middle of the field. This has the exact same look as the coverages above, but becomes completely different.  Now, instead of expecting man-coverage to trips, you’d be getting a true  3-deep 4-under zone defense.  Using nickel and setting the Nic to the field, you can feign him on a blitz (will be used quite a bit in pressures, anyway) bringing him closer to the box giving him less distance to travel to get to the middle of the field.

This has been a basic overview of using a no-huddle defense against the spread with coverage alternatives.  I believe this is truly where defenses are headed in the future (many are already there now) and the need to be creative and thoroughly prepare your players to think for themselves should force us coaches to live on the bleeding edge of the game's innovations.

Good luck this season.....

now presented without comment, a game with two full-time no-huddle nickel defenses...