Showing posts with label Chris Vasseur. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chris Vasseur. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 1, 2010

30 Dime Package: Part I

My name is Chris Vasseur and I coach Safeties at a Junior College in Northern California. I have befriended Brophy on the infamous Coach Huey website (I go by “VassDiddy” over there). I truly consider him the best defensive coach in all of High School football and I have learned so much from him. He invited me to write for this blog and I am extremely excited and honored to do so. I have contributed to the blog before (Virginia Tech Robber and Nick Saban’s Rip/Liz Match articles) but never have written an article.

My first topic is the “30 Dime” blitz package. The 30 Dime package is commonly referred to a 3 DL, 2 LB, and 6 DB defense used in long yardage situations (3rd & Long, 2 Minute). Since I base out of a 4-2-5, I already have 5 Defensive Backs so I would only make one change. I would take out the lesser of the two interior pass rushers, and bring a 6th DB (could be a Safety or a Corner) on the field. For 3-4 or true 4-3 teams, you might have to make 2 substitutions. The change of personnel is all based on your team and what you are facing. Against certain opponents, I would bring my best Corner in the Slot and bring in a 3rd Corner to play outside.

I believe this is the future of the NFL and will eventually permeate college football. I know… you are probably thinking: “Vass, this has been going on for years. What are you talking about?” True, but the implementation and thought process is changing. Teams are no longer just using this as a prevent defense, but as their primary method of pressure. Unless you have two dominant interior pass rushers, this package is perfect. In the first installment of my Dime package manifesto, I will examine why I began utilizing this format and the various coverage combinations that you can utilize. The second part will delve into the blitz and coverage possibilities, and how you can make combination calls to gameplan offensive formations and protections. The third part will examine how I use a “menu” effect to gameplan 3rd Down to create endless possibilities, showing you how you can easily customize this package to fit your system.

Let me start by saying that I am, and have always been a “40 Front” coach. I know there are many ways to skin a cat, and for me, I prefer the 4-Man line. I love the versatility and adjustments versus most offensive formations. I also like the ability to stop the run and play pass without a call or change of personnel, unlike the 3-4. I also think the fronts require less specialization than a traditional 3-4 defense – I believe you only need one true defensive lineman (3 technique) and one true linebacker (Mike). Plus, I went to school and worked briefly for, the University of Miami where the 4-3 was altered and turned into what it is today. I also worked for one of the Godfathers of the 4-4 to 4-2-5 movement. Needless to say, I am a little biased towards the 4-Man line.

My philosophy led me to discover this package. I love to pressure. However, I don’t like to just rush 1 extra defender, because I don’t feel the pressure is really getting home. Conversely, I am not one to roll the dice all the time and just leave people uncovered and/or play with no deep coverage. Don’t get me wrong, I’ll bring 6 or an 8-Man check blitz, but not as the primary method of pressure. This is why I love Fire Zones. They provide a middle ground. You have the ability to overload the offense’s blocking scheme and truly put pressure on them, while having sound, deep coverage. Plus, the creativity and possibilities are endless.

So, I researched everything I could get my hands on. I looked at playbooks, broke down games, talked to coaches, attended clinics, etc., all hoping to learn cutting edge Fire Zones. Over the years, I came to this conclusion: the Over front is great at overloading the weakside, but overloading to the strong side opens up major holes to the weakside (mainly having the slowest and least athletic lineman, the 1 technique, looping to contain, two gaps over). In the Under front, you can overload the strong side, but the weakside overloads aren’t as easy to run (Mike is too far to the strongside to bring). You can bring the Weak Safety down to blitz, but if they have 2 WRs to that side, now what? You have no one to cover! My solution was to blitz from the weakside from the Over front, and stem to an Under front pre-snap, to bring strong side pressures. The problem was solved… or so I thought.

I began coaching with my semi-pro team the spring and had all these face-melting (one of Brophy’s favorite adjectives) blitzes I had collected and installed. The league was a predominantly passing league, which was a departure from the high school league I coached in; our Defensive Ends had to be true pass rushers. We got into the first game and we needed to start bringing pressure to make things happen. The problem was this: in the Over Front, to overload the strong side or up the middle, I had to drop my Weakside Defensive End who is arguably the best pass rusher in the entire league. For the weakside overloads, I had to spike him into the A or B gap. I tried bringing 5 and playing Man-Free and nothing got home. Bring 6? It was almost like an automatic Touchdown. I eventually said, “screw it” and went back to a 4-man rush and the Quarterback had about 7 Mississippi’s to throw it. Needless to say we didn’t do well…


I began looking for answers. I busted out the playbooks and notes I had collected, and watched replays of NFL games. I watched the best defenses in the league at pressuring the Quarterback (i.e. – Jets, Saints) and saw that they were using these 3-Man lines. With this package, we could take out the Nose (my worst pass rusher who had to contain with strongside overloads) and bring in an additional Defensive Back, and bring the same pressures. The best part? I could bring my beast Weakside Defensive End, 100 miles an hour.


I had seen this package before, but they were doing something different. They were running what has become the “traditional” fire zones, the same blitzes with Man-Free coverage, and a Man-Free Peel coverage. They brought 6, played coverage with 6, and had their Defensive Ends still rushing the passer.
The key was that they assigned each edge rusher to “rush to cover the Running Back.” This is especially effective in the NFL because most protections are 6-Man, so he’s going to stay into block anyway.

The 30 Dime Front, allows the defense to run the same blitz paths with different coverage combinations, easier than a 40 front. You could feasibly run the “NCAA” blitz with Fire Zone Cover 3, 2 Trap (2 Deep/4 Under), Roll Cover 2, Man-Free, and Man-Free with an additional rusher and peeling Defensive Ends. When I ran the Over and Under front zone blitzes, I had to try to find one blitz to cover what I wanted to defend – I had to try to find one blitz to beat the protection AND defend the types of routes. If I wanted to bring the “NCAA blitz” for example, I had to play 3 Deep/3 Under, or a poor version of a Roll Cover 2. However, with the 3-Man line, I could create a “menu” because the blitz “paths” were separate from the coverages and were not tied together like the 4-Man line. Now all I had to do was teach the basic coverage concepts (3, 2 Trap, Roll 2, and Man-Free, Man-Free with Peel) and could bring whatever paths I wanted and slap them on a wristband.

To illustrate this point, let’s examine a problem I ran into before I decided to use this package. We faced a Sprint-Out passing team and tried running the infamous “NCAA” blitz to overload the strong/sprint-out side. It beat the protection, but there was a huge problem. We were short to the strongside of our coverage. This is because our Hook 3 player is lined up all the way to weakside and the QB could quickly and easily dump the ball to the 3rd WR. With the Dime package, the DE now rushes and I can simply bring the Dime back over to cover #3. Or, if we wanted to play zone, we could roll the coverage and play a Roll Cover 2 to the Trips side. I began to tinker with the idea and I realized that I could gameplan to beat the protections by choosing the blitz path I wanted. After I decided how to defeat the protections, I could gameplan the coverages I wanted based on the formations they ran, type of passing game, and routes.

An additional bonus of this package is that the Guards have one more thing to worry about. In our 40 Front, one had the 3 technique and the other combo’d the 1 with the Center. In the Bear (which we run a lot of), they were both man-to-man. In the 30 Front, the Guards have to Dual Read, a completely different read and technique.

Also, the Dime package allows us to keep the zone coverage responsibilities consistent. Out of a 4-man line is that you have to exchange coverage responsibilities with your DE and ILB. If only 1 WR, the DE drops Wall to Flat and the ILB has to drop Hook 3. If there are 2 or more, the ILB has to drop out to Wall/Flat and the DE drops inside for Hook 3. This is because you don’t want a Defensive End carrying a Slot WR vertically.

This may seem like a lot of stuff. It can be if you look at each blitz as its own separate entity. However, if you teach the coverage concepts, mixing and matching blitz paths with them is simple. In fact, I used this with a semi-pro team that practiced once a week, and only 50% of the team showed up. With the cunning use of wristbands and simplicity in teaching coverages, you can mix and match all of these concepts to create your own menu.

In the next installment, I will detail the various paths and coverages you can use in detail. Also, I will touch on how you can make “combo calls” to designate the coverages you want to play versus 2x2 sets, vs. 3x1 and Empty sets.

I look forward to contributing more and please feel free to ask questions, comment, or heckle me in the comments section.

Good luck this season and I’ll “see” you soon!
-Vass

P.S. Thanks Korey Gray for helping me discover this package by telling me you didn’t want to drop anymore. I was blinded by all the fancy X’s and O’s and I didn’t let my best player do his thing.

Friday, August 27, 2010

Blogger Addition: VassDiddy

He's the President of Punk.
The Earl of Funk.
The Duke of Cool.
The Ayatollah of Rock-and-Roll-a




.........and he's now blogging here!

Chris Vasseur, a long time friend and coaching cohort, is the epitome of coaching passion and youthful grind. Coach Vass has been coaching near a decade, spanning the football hotbeds of Florida to Northern California, and will be dropping encyclopedias of knowledge and insight.

He is a very welcome addition to the host of geniacs like Hemlock, Coach Hoover, and Charlie Means.

Saturday, July 25, 2009

Virginia Tech Robber

Without an original thought in my head, I am going to piggy-back on a brilliant article recently authored by coaches Chris Brown ( http://smartfootball.blogspot.com/2009/07/deconstructing-virginia-tech-defense.html ) and Chris Vasseur analyzing the evolution of the Va Tech Hokie 42 from an 8-man Robber, to their current, 7-man front quarters look. The article can be read here;

http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/blog/dr_saturday/post/Deconstructing-How-the-Hokie-D-becomes-deadlier?urn=ncaaf,178348



Both contributors are great minds of the game and Coach Vass has run the 44 "G" with Hokie "Tuff" front (bear) and Robber concepts for years.

As an aside to that piece, I am offering this treatise on Robber that may illustrate the evolution of the game from the days of our youth into what we have today. Fans of 'defensive football' will no doubt have an affinity for the violence associated with the likes of Buddy Ryan's 46 defense and other unrelenting, aggressively swarming dominant defenses of the 80s.

What does that have to do with the Robber? Well, sports fans, quite a bit. When we reminisce of these grand days of Hollywood football, we often do not account for WHY certain schemes were successful when they were, and are can be puzzled at why we don't see these schemes much any more or why they aren't as dominant as they once were.

What you'll find with the Robber and 46 is though their concepts are different from one another, the reason behind their success isn't. The ability to stuff the box with more defenders than could be blocked means someone is coming free (because you ran out of people to account for all those defenders). What broke (or accelerated defensive Darwinism) Robber, also broke the 46.

Offenses of the era were hamstrung by painting themselves into a (formation) corner by relying on 2 back, tight end formations in an effort to bring more numbers to the point of attack than the defense had. Rather than fight fire with fire (keep adding additional bodies to block), the solution was to stress the defensive front (and coverage) by REMOVING numbers from the box (think of the adage, "you've got to spend money to make money"). By displacing one of the two backs outside the box, the offense gained a horizontal stretch on the defense. This had the ability to stress coverage and run-support to a breaking point. More and more, offenses began finding strength in going on the attack of these explosive defenses (Seifert-era 49ers were notorious for their exploitation of using William Floyd & Ricky Watters in these coverage-stressing roles).

The following is an illustration of Va Tech Robber during the infancy of its dominance, the 1998 season. With players like Keion Carpenter, Pierson Prioleau, Loren Johnson, and Corey Moore, the Hokies were just starting to develop a stride of aggressive defensive players that they would carry through the new millenium.


These shots are against a young Syracuse Donovan McNabb. The Orangmen eventually won this game, which many feel Syracuse squeaked by based on the ineptness of Tech's offense, coordinated by Rickey Bustle (now HC at ULL), and not the result of defense. These shots best capture what the "robber" was made for, and also show what caused it to evolve.


The first graphic beautifully captures the numbers matchup of the formation du jour of the era, 2-back pro. With just a single receiver split on one side of the formation (flanker I), the corners could essentially lock down any 5-7 step vertical throw, allowing the FS to "rob" and put the defense at a +1 advantage in the run game (8 offensive players - 8 box defenders + 1 FS).







In the Va Tech Robber, the Corners align in typical Cover 3 leverage, looking to shuffle into the 3 step and bail into 5 step game. They bail to take away deep 1/2 vertical throws, knowing they have help on pass inside with the deep hole safety.
he key for the FS is the TE, if he releases vertically and gets depth on the underneath linebackers, he is free to take the TE man-to-man in a speed matchup he is sure to win. If the TE stays in for protection, or releases shallow, underneath the linebackers, the FS is free to "rob" any inside breaking route from either of the single receivers (typically this would come from the backside X). The read is clear and distinct, allowing the FS to confidently play this technique against any 2-back offense with a TE.
You'll note the depth of the FS in these pictures, playing at almost LB depth around 8 yards. A reach, arc release, or down block from the TE initiates a run read for the FS, allowing him to aggressively fit the alley support as an unblockable defender in the run. Typically, in the 80s and 90s, that is essentially all offenses did, anyway (run/pass out of 2-back sets). The FS in robber is flat-footed and looking to move forward at the snap.
In this first example, we find the Orangemen in a 2-back pro-formation, running a play-action pass at the Hokies. Notice the FS's shoulders turning immediately to the #1 receiver as McNabb's shoulders square up and declare that this was not a run.





At the snap, the FS reads the high-hat pass read, and follows McNabb's shoulders to the now vertical X receiver running a post. With the corner in phase over the top of the receiver, the FS "robs" this route from the inside-and-underneath and finishes the play with a pass break-up.




The "robber" allowed the Hokies to essentially double-cover a single receiver, while at the same time, had it been a run, get an additional defender in to stop the run. With only 3 possible immediate vertical threats, the FS was able to quickly check off to the most dangerous man and aggressively play ball.



This game may serve as an illustration of the constant cat-and-mouse game offenses and defenses play with formations vs coverage, as you will see Syracuse's option attack test and experiment how they could best match up against one of the best 8-man fronts of the era. Syracuse uses 2 tight ends, 2-backs, and at times 3-backs, to attempt to stymie the onslaught of Tech's aggressive front, but as this next example shows, it is addition by subtraction that wins the day for the offense.


The next play here shows a completely different look. No longer are the Orangemen presenting 3 vertical threats, but now they have 4 vertical threats spaced horizontally, forcing the Hokies to account for these 4 over the 53 1/3 yard width of the field.





Now the chess match begins.


What is the 'right' decision?



Do you cover/respect the vertical threat of these 4 receivers? To do so, means you can no longer support the 8 man box



Do you treat the gifted McNabb as a runner and stay in an 8 man front? To do so, means you can no longer support the 4 verticals with only 3 deep defenders



To stay in Robber, would put 2 receivers on 1 FS, making an easy read for the QB to find which one will be open.







The Hokies chose the conservative approach, minimizing their liabilities by matching the formation, checking to Cover 4, and fortunately, bottling the receivers allowed the defensive line time to finally sack McNabb..




If you remember the game, McNabb was a terror running on the perimeter out of these spread sets. That aggressive offensive concept has been all too familiar throughout the last decade of football (and one the Hokies, themselves, would employ with Michael Vick the next year).








For more 'study' of the old Hokie Robber, check out the game film at;


SIDEBAR