Overcoming the Advantage of Run-Pass Option Offenses

Much has been made of the advancements of offenses in this 'modern age' of football.  There are endless articles on these new spread plays, but what of the defense? What can a defense do to not only adapt but limit the seemingly endless advantages of these offenses?  

Under Defense - Pete Jenkins

The ultimate front against 2-back offenses.
 Learn Saban's method of using Under by the one and only Pete Jenkins.


For more great resources on Under, check out Coach Jerry Gordon's book 

2-Gap / 1-Gap Defense with Pete Jenkins

 More genius from Pete Jenkins

Coverage: It’s Academic

Believe it or not, we’re entering the fifth season of this blog, though only getting the hang of it for the last three.  That being said, the next few posts will lean heavily on archived content so not to insult any of you readers by retreading previous topics.

As we’ve covered before,  remaining gap-sound in run-support is a fundamental equation that is addressed every snap based on the formation.  In this post, we’ll look to set a foundation of defensive concepts through fragmentation.  After setting this ground work, it will be followed with different alternative coverage adaptations available to a defense.

One of the biggest mistakes for those learning the game of football is to fixate on the minutiae of various “brands” of defense.  Tying oneself to the dogmatic thinking and going-through-the-motions of “how we’ve always done it” without understanding the rationale of how it all works creates an intelligence rut that becomes a liability.  Defenses exist to defense an offense – they do not exist within vacuums.  On every play you’re defending something the offense is doing to advance the ball.  For this reason, defenses aren’t static entities – they must respond (adapt) to the stimuli they are presented with.   You will hear people declare, “we are a 3-4 Quarters defense” or something to that effect.  That’s great, but there is a reason a defensive concept is employed on a given down, and there is no catch-all defense available.

"Exhibit A"
Belichick on Defense

“At the Browns we played a 4-3,” Belichick said. “We won two Super Bowls playing a 4-3. In ’01 and (‘04). Second half of the ’01 season, we played 4-3 after Bryan Cox and (Ted) Johnson got hurt.”
“In all honesty, most people thought we played a 4-3 at the Giants,” Belichick said.

“Lawrence Taylor did a lot more rushing than he did pass dropping. He was probably 90 percent of the time, 80 to 90 percent of the time he was the rusher in the defense. Now not every play was a pass, but certainly in passing situations and on a lot of pass plays, he was the designated fourth rusher which really put us in what amounts to a 4-3. I think honestly that’s somethingthat’s a media fabrication. There are a lot of different alignments out there, you see 4-3 teams use odd spacing, you see 3-4 teams use even spacing.”

“Look, you have 11 players,” Belichick continued. “You can put them in various positions. Whether you want to put it in the pregame depth chart as one thing or another I think is a little bit overrated. You play different fronts, you play different spacings and you teach the techniques of your defense and that is what is consistent. The techniques that are taught in the different defensive systems, whichever one you want to talk about, are consistent within those systems.

A defense really just needs to be concerned about offensive numbers (and how to match them) and the offensive capabilities from their alignment.

While touched on a while ago with TCU’s split-field philosophy,  the divorcing of the secondary from the front minimizes the detail of checks a defense would need to concern itself with as well as compartmentalizing the teaching method for each player position.  While coverage and front remain related by arithmetic, they can become independent of one another and still function together seamlessly.

its nothing but numbers

First things first is to match the front.  In every offensive formation you will have 5 offensive linemen, creating 6 gaps for an offense to attack.  The defense should have a plan to account for these 6 gaps presented, typically with 6 defenders (i.e. “the box”).  If we (continue to) use the 42 Nickel as a base concept (all of this remains true if you’re a 4-3, 3-4, 33, 50, etc), your bare minimum in the box will be 6 defenders that won’t ever have a reason to “break” their alignment because they ARE the box (they are the minimum gaps being defensed).

As more offensive players are introduced into the box, they create additional areas of attack through leverage (gaps).  The defense will fundamentally respond by adding more defenders to this area or risk being out-numbered at the point of attack.



Adding an additional back or tight end to the formation creates even more running lanes, necessitating yet another defender into the box to compensate.


All of this becomes a very academic application that generally gives you a clue as to what and how an offense is trying to set up its next play;

• if you get 1-back you’ll have 7 gaps
  
• if you get 2-back you’ll have 8 gaps

It also lays a conceptual ‘budget’ for the coordinator.  If you get X personnel grouping, you need to respond with Y defensive package and anticipate a limited selection of attacks.

After addressing the numbers in the box, you will have to figure out what you’re going to do with those other guys left in the secondary.   For the remainder of this post (and subsequent posts), we will ignore the box defenders and fragment our discussion into the leftovers of the formation.
With 1-back, we’ll have 2x2 (4 immediate vertical threats) and 5 defenders to match them.
With 2-back, we’ll have 3 immediate vertical threats with (essentially) 4 defenders to compensate.  With 2-back (or 3x1), you can get away with doing some flexible things to the single-split side without carrying tremendous risk.

 

Like we discussed in the earlier TCU 2-Read post, we’re going to narrow our focus on the 3-on-2 matchup to the slot receiver side.  When the defense is presented with two split receivers it faces an immediate horizontal stretch (away from the box) while being threatened with a vertical / levels attack.

Fortunately, because of the numbers advantage, there are several ways to play this set between these three defenders (with each having distinct advantages).  Keep in mind, the variations listed below could plug-and-play any one of these defenders into a role (hence the multiplicity in how slot is treated).

You could feature 1 underneath force player and 2 deep coverage defenders (sky, cloud,  buzz).  This could be country Cover 3, quarter-halves, or bracket coverage on the #1 receiver.
You could have 1 deep defender over the top of 2 underneath defenders.  This could be anything such as traditional Cover 2, robber or bracket coverage on #2.
Or have 1 deep defender with 1 underneath (seam) defender that could be Quarters (Meg) or fire zone.

Or it could simply be man-under coverage with deep help.
All of these alternatives can be played from one defensive (presnap) alignment, yet create a world of hurt if an offense filtered their throws through defender reads.

A feature of this exposition should be to illustrate how "what TCU does" (in the secondary) is actually what every other defense (NCAA/NFL) does - they both end up in the same scheme when its all said and done.  With TCU's patented "3 coverages", you end up with a combination of 9 coverages available (2, Blue, 5, 25, 2 Blue, Blue 5, Blue 2, 5 Blue, 52).  All of this is a result of how the slot is played.  Whether you are the Horned Frogs, the New York Giants, or the San Diego State Aztecs.....whatever scheme you call yourself playing; you arrive at the same destination.

With this preface set, in the next few posts we will discuss the many different slot coverage adaptations available to a defensive coordinator.  We’ll explore how they work within the overall scheme, why it is advantageous to not only treat slot sets differently, but also how to effectively keep quarterbacks guessing when confronted with all the variations the defense can give them.

Nebraska Over / Under Front

After another exciting college football season in 2009, there weren't many stories that were as satisfying as the Nebraska Cornhuskers return to national significance with Head Coach Bo Pelini.

Lead by once-in-a-lifetime freak of nature, Ndamukong Suh, the Huskers dominated opponents through the season and narrowly missed an opportunity at a National Championship ( after completely dominating the explosive Texas Longhorn offense in the Big XII championship game).

With such a phenomenal athlete graduating, you'd be hard pressed to believe the defense in Lincoln could improve on such a performance. Think again....

With up-and-coming Sophomore phenom NT, Baker Steinkuhler (55), and his returning linebackers Will Compton (51) and Sean Fisher (42), this youth movement will prove to be a integral part of the Blackshirts rebirth in 2010.

In this post, we'll look at how the Nebraska base front sets the philosophy behind everything Pelini does. In subsequent posts, we'll look at the secret behind their overwhelming pressure and how it relates to these base defensive principles.

At the core of it, Bo Pelini has a made a name for creating fundamentally sound defenses that play fast, year in and year out. Among the signatures of these defenses is a dominating front 7. The fundamental concept behind this defense is his use of the Under / Over defense. This is a 7 man front, complimented by 8-man (front) principles (of bringing a safety down in support).

Pelini will install his entire defense within one practice. This simplicity affords built in answers to everything an offense can present, as well as a foundation to build off of for multiplicity.

Every offense, according to this philosophy, is determined by numbers. The key factor that swings numbers for the offense (at the point of attack) is the Tight End. Pelini spends a lot of time teaching identifying and explaining why teams get into those personnel groupings, then how to handle all adjustments. Once the defense recognizes what an offense presents, it can begin narrowing down the types of actions the offense can deliver in any given personnel grouping. For instance, "21" (2 backs, 1 TE) would predominantly run-centered defense, primarily geared to attack to the Tight End side. "11" personnel eliminates the threat of lead runs and is geared more to the passing game. With "10" personnel, they just need to determine if it is a pro or slot look. The entire defense is built off of where the TE is. So by identifying personnel groupings immediately after a play, the defense narrows their focus to determine if they have to look for a TE or a slot.

"Once you know the personnel you can anticipate formations by process of elimination.

• We treat 12 & 21 the same. In 12 we consider the U the fullback
• Vs. 21 think I-pro or I-slot.
• Vs. 12 think pro or slot pair.
• Vs. 11 we are thinking in terms of doubles (2x2) or trips (3x1) & since there is a TE they can still form a slot. We always go into a game with a check vs. slot trips
• Vs. 10 we are thinking in terms of doubles (2x2) or trips (3x1) & since there is no TE they can’t form a slot.
• Vs. 20 A pro set is the only formation that can be formed. Any change of strength motion, same as, “Y-TRADE.”

Fast accurate identification is very important because it gives the entire defense time to adjust. We usually go into a game with a number of automatic checks and adjustments based on formations. "

With a Tight end in a formation, the Under front allows the defense to match numbers by aligning a linebacker tight, outside the tight end. This gives the defense 4 defenders to a 3 man surface (neutralizing any offensive numbers advantage). Shown here is the under alignment:


The remaining linebackers are protected in the front with a 7 technique and 1 technique in a strong side bubble with the Mike. The common weakness in a tight end formation is the weakside bubble. The under front now covers up this liability with a 3 technique and 5 technique end. This alignment effectively covers up the bubble and protects the 10 technique Will linebacker.

To simplify things, Pelini categorizes his fronts into families, coded by east and west coast cities. Under is west coast, over is east coast. The Under family is based out of Frisco (Under Zone X) and Vegas (man) and its compliment is Boston (Over Zone Y) and Philly (man).



Pelini's defense will always align in a 2-high shell, to always present the same presnap look. Though presenting a 7 man front, the defense will drop the safety away from the Buck to serve as the backside contain player. This method known as "Lever-Spill-Lever" and through it, the defense evens up the numbers (gap fits) available with 2-backs in flow action.

• B-force (curl/flat)
• M-Lever (hook)
• W-Spill (hook)
• BS-Lever (curl/flat)

So as action flows strong, the Buck cuts off the perimeter as the force player. The Lever player maintains outside leverage on the lead back (attacking outside-in), engaging with the inside arm. The Spill player attacks the lead back inside-out. This forces either of these players free to attack the ball carrier and/or force the ball carrier to bounce to the force player or the backside lever player this puts the defense at a numbers advantage at the point of attack.

Dropping the safety, creates an 8 man front, and obviously puts the secondary in a 1-high (MOFC) coverage that essentially amounts to cover 3.

Even with the man principle (Vegas) the Lever-Spill-Lever concept remains with 1-high (man-free) man coverage, with a 3-on-2 on the backs with the M,W, and down safety.

With the tight end number advantage neutralized, and the run-fit supported within the front, how can an offense gain a strategic advantage?

If the front is set (by the tight end), the easiest thing an offense can do is move the tight end and reset the strength of the formation (trade). Bingo! Now, the offense has moved away from the teeth of the defense and has reset against the defense's deficiency.

With each Under concept (play) introduced, Pelini also introduces its front compliment (opposite). If the TE motions or shifts, the Buck linebacker will adjust. If teams attempt to Y-trade (shift the TE after the front is set), the defense already has a built-in answer. Because there is already an automatic response to TE trades/shifts, the advantage for offenses has been neutralized. This effectively eliminates matchup exploitations and offense could typically use before a game has begun.

If more than one player shifts, the defense will simply reset the front (see example below). Notice the DT and NT adjusting their alignment ('1' to a '3').


With the Over front, the same principles apply, with the exception of the Buck linebacker making the adjustment (away from the TE) and shifting the front (1 & 3 tech).




The Lever-Spill-Lever concept still applies to the Over front, simply by adding a down safety (away from the Buck linebacker) into the 7-man front.

As you’ll see in this example, Virginia tech comes out in slot to the field (walking the Buck out on the slot) and attempts to set the front with a tight end and upback to the field (quads). You can see the linebackers attempting to set an Over front (and looking at the front like, “you can’t be serious – who are you fooling with this quads set?”). Tech quickly shifts (aha!) to outflank the defense, only to have the linebackers simply reset the front with little thought required.





The corner assumes the boundary role to the closed side and acts as the force player (with the SS as help over the top).

The flow action has the corner establishing leverage to cut-off the perimeter and the Will (#52) fast-flows to leverage the runner as the ‘lever’ player. The Mike (#51) slow plays the action to squeeze the runner inside-out as the spill player.


The ball carrier is left with no legitimate options to find daylight (bounced to boundary corner or trapped by the spill / backside lever player). The backside Buck (#42) enters the play in a controlled lever position.



In subsequent posts, we'll take a look at how, out of these base concepts, Pelini routinely generates pressure through personnel groupings and coverage to frustrate and stall offenses.

AFC: Automatic Front Check

I can't stress this enough - the cheap way of holding the chalk (last) on the field with this AFC concept we stole from Auburn (who stole it from countless others) years ago.

This is just an automatic check for the defense, that whenever they see a particular formation, they will check out of whatever was called and into the preferred coverage/front to best match-up with a given situation. Again, this is SIMPLE to do and ensures your guys are never caught with their pants down by being out-formationed.

In the situation below, we had the tendencies of this offense down to whenever they went to this Power-I look, they only hit 2 particular areas of attack. Because of this, we felt that the BEST defense in our arsenal against this set was "6 Under Will Line", which is just a strong side loaded zone (6), with an Under front and putting the bubble LB on the line....this is essentially a 6-1 defense.

So, regardless of whatever we actually called in the huddle, once the MLB/WLB recognized this formation, they immediately checked out into our preferred call. All this took was 10 minutes on Monday, recognizing the backfield set, and we were good for the entire week of game prep. We would present a couple of different formations the team would run (2x2,3x1,1x2), and the minute we lined up in double-tight-power-I...the *** hit the fan and we had the kids going bananas over their alert.

Base call "3" ----- checks into "6 Under Will Line" when confronted with Power-I (formation check)

Talking with the coaches from the other team later in that season, they mentioned they didn't know what was happening to them because their Power-I attack had previously been unstoppable.

Defensive Installation

42 Nickel Installation clips from a few years ago as an example of building the foundation into the season.

• 0 - 6:30 Summer Team Camp installation
• 6:30 - 10:30 Preseason intrasquad scrimmage
• 10:30 - 17:00 Broadcast clips shown to players of defense style / pressure, check-blitz, & robber cov. (Va Tech)
• 17:00 - 24:24 3rd week scripted TEAM session
• 24:30 - 28:00 6th week scripted TEAM session

The scripted TEAM sessions are probably the most relevant bits to watch as the speed and efficiency of getting plays ran and also reinforcing run-fits of your defense.

This is just lagniappe, but here are more practice clips;

TCU's 42 Nickel Blitz & Coverage Concepts

As an addendum to the AFCA article post about TCU's 'divorced front & coverage' earlier in the week ( http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2009/07/tcus-42-nickel-coverage-front.html ), I am going to offer what I know about their blitz concepts and how it correlates to the coverages they run out of them.

Their calls are meant to tell all 11 guys what to do and not just effect individuals or groups of players. TCU signals in all their calls with wristbands that all players wear. This makes their rather verbose terminology more efficient in communicating and eliminates the need for signalling.

There are three distinctly different front blitz concepts utilized

BULLETS - linebackers (Mike / Sam) blitzes
SMOKES - Safeties (Strong/Weak) edge blitzes
DOGS - Safeties & linebacker blitzes

Their calls are always determined by how they set the front. Their front will be determined by their call, made by either the offensive formation formation (tight/split) or by hash (field/boundary)

Their basic 4 man fronts are TITE (7 & 3 strong / 5 & 1 weak)
or the traditional G (7 & 3 strong / 5 & 2i weak)


BULLETS
The first example would be;
TITE BULLETS "A"

LBs align by front with 7 / 3 strong and 1/5 weak, with the Mike backer in the bubble.
"Bullets A" tells the backers to run through A gaps. These are essentially run blitzes. This is just an exchange stunt for run-thrus, not a traditional wanton-abandon blitz, just an aggressive run-thru gap exchange.

Another example is;
TITE TORO BULLETS OKIE

Toro tells the NT to cross the face of the center
"Okie" tells the backers to blitz opposite of the center, away from the callside. This puts the Mike in the B gap, and the Sam crossing the face of the center to fill backside A gap. He becomes the rat and reads run first.

The last type of BULLET blitz is;
MO/SOW
Mike Outside
Sam Outside


TITE TAKE BULLETS MO

Mike loops outside to the edge, the defensive end stunts down inside (TAKE) to B gap.
Sam in the strong A bubble


SMOKES
Smokes are outside safeties blitzing from outside the box. As a general rule in TCU's defense the FS will never blitz.


Smokes can be defined just like the front, depending on what kind of pressure is needed.
SMOKE WIDE (from the field), SHORT SMOKE (from the boundary), DOUBLE SMOKE (both safeties blitzing).

Another way to define the smoke is based on formation strength. THUNDER/LIGHTENING (rather than by hash) determines which safety will blitz (strong or weak safety).
"T"hunder to TE (strength)
"L"ightening away from TE

With SMOKE, the end will need to know if he has additional edge pressure with him. It is the safety's responsibility to make a 'FIRE' call to alert the end that he is coming off the edge. If the end receives a high-hat pass read, he now has a free (2-way) rush. The purpose is not to have one guy (Offensive Tackle) blocking two guys coming off the edge (DE/S)

Additionally, on a SMOKE call, a safety can make a "LION" call to alert the end that he is going inside the rush lane, so that the DE should continue on a wide rush.

For option rules; Safety is pitch on SMOKE, End is pitch on LION


DOG
Dog blitzes involve both the linebacker & Safety from the same side. These are generally called
"T Dog" /"S Dog" to generally coordinate with field / boundary (short side) calls

As an example;
FIELD AIM WIDE DOG B

"AIM" front angle away from call
Wide Dog B = Sam & Safety from the wide side are blitzing (with Sam in B gap)
Safety from edge
Sam to outside
T to A
Nose to A
E to B

TITE TWIST T DOG A

T & N twist
Sam to B
E to C
S to D (outside)

MOB

MOB is an 8 man pressure, with all safeties and linebackers blitzing. When facing a TE in MOB, a "COP" call is made to alert the callside end to play man-to-man on the Tight End. The "COP" alert allows the FS to remain free, while not requiring a safety or backer to check out of the blitz.

In all of TCU's coverage concepts;

• The Corners will always have the 1st receiver, and they will trade based on where true X & Z receiver types align.
• The Safeties always have 2nd receiver (as long as #2 is outside the tackles).
• The FS is always free, so long as there is no 3rd receiver outside the box.

To keep the linebackers together (and not displacing their alignment), they will "fiddle" on 2 backs (take first back to flow their way with opposite backer defaulting to the other back) and banjo any 1 back look (linebacker to flow will take the back man-to-man, while the other linebacker is the rat in the hole).

With TCU's 6 man front shell, they will never have the LBs leave the box. They will adjust to formations with their safeties.

If #2 weak walks into the box, then both LBs have a back and the WS becomes deep 1/2 player.
C0 corners are 1x7 and play loose, reading 3 step, then hard focus turn onto WR.
Trade corners.

Against trips looks, the outside corner will always play in a press/bail technique, while the inside defender will play loose / off.

TCU's coverage concept allows 2 coverage players free at all times, not unlike the old "11 Robber" used in the 90's by Charlie McBride at Nebraska.

In the following game scenarios, we will take a look at these principles in practice versus various formations and attacks.

Here versus an even formation out of double-tights. TCU presents a 2-high MOFO shell, but it actually becomes Cover 1, with strong and weak safeties accounting for the Tight Ends, and one linebacker blitzing.

Here is a trips looks (Kings/Trey) with a TE. Again, the same 2-high MOFO coverage shell is presented, but at the snap, the field safety is on a SMOKE, so the FS (the guy on the right hash) immediately opens to the 3rd receiver (Tight End). The spacing concept ISU was running here gets eaten up and the hesitation causes the quarterback to take an immediate sack.

And finally a doubles-to-2-back attack, common with spread option teams. A 1-back look motions into a 2-back formation, but the "AIM OKIE" call actually puts TCU in position to pick up the triple-option threat and stuff this run for a loss. The Mike on the Okie stunt loops outside to take the 2nd back, with the backside Sam stacking the A gap controlling the dive back.