A valiant effort by Louisiana Tech against formerly ranked Mississippi State, coming up short in overtime.
Something new Tony Franklin used in this game was an unbalanced trey 2-back look (like Heavy Over, but from the gun and H is off).
Franklin ran power, counter, and reverse out of this set……
and ended up setting up a huge 3rd down conversion in the 4th quarter running 51 Solid off of Rodeo action (02:34:52 of broadcast).
Though they lost, the 17 year old quarterback Isham produced in the passing game using Stick, Levels, Drive, and Y Cross (end of regulation interception in the end zone) even with the running back injured (Creer) and the multi-purpose H-back (Holley) out for the game. On the final interception, needing to inch closer to convert the downs (5 yards), likely because of the inconsistent short-yardage production from the banged up Lennon Creer, Tech opts for Y Cross isolating standout receiver, Quinton Patton, in the boundary with a double outlet underneath to the field. Mississippi State presses the line of scrimmage showing press cover 1, essentially baiting Isham to throw the 1-on-1 with Patton. At the snap, MSU bails out to cover 3, Patton's cornerback retreats deep with deep help from the free safety in the end zone. Because MSU disguised this so well (discouraging the run with 7 defenders versus the 5 blockers), it was too late for Isham to recognize the Hi-Lo on the lone MSU linebacker to the field.
Along with pursuit and tackling (fundamentals) of defense, is the rather academic application of adjusting your defense to the offensive threat you face. In most defenses the player that drastically alters what the defense actually is, the strong safety.
A lot has been discussed in the last 20 years ( in the wake of the evolution of 2-high defenses) about the role, prototype, and alignment of the “strong safety”. You likely hear this ad nauseum if you are forced to listen to any NFL broadcast, about “bringing a safety down”. Great, sure sounds awesome, but what does it mean and why?
This discussion will cover the ceaseless pendulum swing between offensive and defensive attacks and counterattacks that evolves each season. Back during your “daddy’s day” when receivers were in 3-point stances, everyone played with 2 backs and sometimes 3 backs in the backfield. To even the odds against this, defenses began stuffing more and more people in the box (1-high) to stop the run-heavy attacks.
To create more breathing room, offenses found a way to adjust by removing a back, forcing the defenses to expand with them (eliminating a defender from the box).
The more offenses expanded, the more defenses had to adjust and eventually relying on 2-high defenses to remain viable against the vertical passing game. The advent of 1-back looks (made popular by Dennis Erickson in the 80’s with WSU and Miami) became the (then) “spread”, even though Erickson admittedly says the entire point of going 1-back for him, was to RUN the ball. It may sound odd, but when we take a look at WHAT 1-back looks do to a defense, it becomes apparent what the offense is looking to exploit.
The fundamental element in defense is supporting all available run-gaps that an offense presents. If there is one gap not accounted for, then an offense has an immediate path for yardage. 2-high defenses became all the rage in the late 90’s into this current generation because of this 1-back adaptation. First things first, what is the offense presenting the defense? How many backs are in the ball game? How many tight ends?
“21” (2 backs, 1 tight end) typically gives you a 2-back, pro-formation look. With 2 in the backfield, you will likely be threatened by some type of 2x1 look. The extra man in the backfield (fullback / H-back) provides an extra gap for the defense to support (just like a second tight end). With 2-back looks, you are immediately threatened with lead runs (iso, power, sweep) that will put 1+ offensive player at the point of attack.
“11” (1 back, 1 tight end) will give you a single-back look. This immediately eliminates the threat of lead runs (unless you have to contend with the new [Rodriguez-type] spread, where the QB is a rushing threat). With only 1 back, you will end up with a 3x1 or 2x2 set that can stress a defense with 2 inside verticals (passing threat), but be without that extra (run fit) gap.
Although adjusting nicely and bottling up 1-back looks, the defense, through this expansion away from the ball, was opening the middle of the field. This became a void offenses would later exploit by turning shotgun ‘spread’ formations into run-heavy attacks.
The Next Step
Now to the current trend for defenses, how do they get an ‘extra hat’ at the point of attack (and beat the offense to the punch)? As outlined by people like Nick Saban, the MOFC defense allows a defense to put more defenders in the box and allocate the most people to stop the run, inside-out (protecting the middle of the field, first). To achieve both the security of covering the immediate threats of alignment (split) and also get the benefits of shutting of the middle of the field, defenses are finding ways to show 2-high, then bring a safety down late. From here, with pattern-matching principles, the sky is the limit for defenses and the way they attack the ball. With pattern-matching, you can now actually play “man”(to-man) as well as expand to match the passing threats. This arithmetic enables a defense to also bring 5+ man pressure, drop linemen in coverage, and or anything else you can dream up.
In the following clips below, you can see how personnel groupings essentially telegraph what formations you will see on a given play. In each example, the defense is going to play a 1-high MOFC coverage and bring the safety down for run-support/cover-down. The trick is, it typically is showing a 2-high look at the snap to play the traditional coverage-matchup-with-formation game that offenses are looking to exploit. vs 21 personnel
vs 11 personnel
Then, you can get creative and not only protect the middle of the field, but also bring pressure (1-high fire zones).
This current trend of defenses gleaning the best attributes of schemes into some quasi-natural selection process creates a deadly and effective method for accounting for fundamental principles of good football. Defenses, with the usage of proper coverage support, pattern-matching principles, and multi-talented linemen (ability to drop to cover receiving threats), are able to open a maelstrom of disguised looks. Defenses can present one look at presnap and morph its use to fit any and all offensive threats after the snap. No longer are defenses limited by walking out on displaced receivers (in man) or staying cemented within the box to stop the run. With these principles of adaptation, the chalk can be held by defensive coordinators a while longer.
I can't stress this enough - the cheap way of holding the chalk (last) on the field with this AFC concept we stole from Auburn (who stole it from countless others) years ago.
This is just an automatic check for the defense, that whenever they see a particular formation, they will check out of whatever was called and into the preferred coverage/front to best match-up with a given situation. Again, this is SIMPLE to do and ensures your guys are never caught with their pants down by being out-formationed.
In the situation below, we had the tendencies of this offense down to whenever they went to this Power-I look, they only hit 2 particular areas of attack. Because of this, we felt that the BEST defense in our arsenal against this set was "6 Under Will Line", which is just a strong side loaded zone (6), with an Under front and putting the bubble LB on the line....this is essentially a 6-1 defense.
So, regardless of whatever we actually called in the huddle, once the MLB/WLB recognized this formation, they immediately checked out into our preferred call. All this took was 10 minutes on Monday, recognizing the backfield set, and we were good for the entire week of game prep. We would present a couple of different formations the team would run (2x2,3x1,1x2), and the minute we lined up in double-tight-power-I...the *** hit the fan and we had the kids going bananas over their alert.
Base call "3" ----- checks into "6 Under Will Line" when confronted with Power-I (formation check)
Talking with the coaches from the other team later in that season, they mentioned they didn't know what was happening to them because their Power-I attack had previously been unstoppable.
"There are 119 Division 1A teams playing college football.
There are 110 pussies playing free safety.
I'm not worried about safeties."
In this post, we are going to examine the offensive attack of Herb Hand of Tulsa (formerly of West Virginia). The Tulsa offense has been at the top of every offensive category for the past few years, due largely to the intense pressure both Hand and (Gus) Malzahn systematically put on a defense. This post will illustrate the many facets of their running attack and the pressure it induces on a defense, particularly safeties and run-force players.
"The first thing we look at is formations and how our formations affect the opposing defense......The last thing we look for is match-ups and how we can create favorable match-ups in our passing game through formations, motions, shifts, play actions, screens, etc." - excerpt from, thespreadoffense.com
The offense, itself, is actually quite simple. The Oline only has to distinguish between two types of defenses (odd or even) and any subset of that classification (base or stack). This helps maintain simplicity in blocking assignments and run keys. The offensive line is further aided by the no-huddle, unrelenting tempo of the offense, which usually forces defenses to play more conservative base looks.
If there are four down linemen;
If there is no true MLB (2 ILBs) - it is an a base even front
If there is a MLB - it is an even stack front
If there are three down linemen;
If there is no true MLB (2 ILBs) - it is an a base odd front
If there is a MLB - it is an odd stack front
This classification of fronts intuitively aides in coverage recognition;
Any base even front = 8 man box. which puts you in a 1-high defense
Any even stack front = 7 man box, which puts you in a 2-high defense
Any odd stack front = 8 man box. which puts you in a 1-high defense
Any base odd front = 7 man box, which puts you in a 2-high defense
The base run game is premised on inside and outside zone, with an ample saturation of some type of option threat and misdirection.
Breaking defenses with Inside Zone (with four theats)
Hand also shares the confidence of Gunter Brewer of attacking fire zones with the inside zone run. In fact, when running zone away from the blitz, it creates an even clearer picture for the back and an easier assignment for the Oline. The Oline just need to keep the slanting defensive linemen running (horizontally), which opens a clear vertical seam for the back. The Oline just has to run their defender off. With both read keys running, the back has an instant decision to press the gap and "bang it" vertically. If 1st read is running and 2nd read is running (as pictured), they back just bends it back once he presses the heels of the Oline.
Here the playside safety will not be accounted for (in the blocking scheme). With only 6 in the box, the call is to grind it into the teeth of the defense with inside zone. This will put 7 blockers on 6 defenders.
On run-action inside, he should be looking to fit to the A gap.
As he makes his approach off of run-read, he continues to out-leverage himself on the runner.
By the time he realizes the mistake, the back has already burst through the seam and is on his way to score.
Hand's philosophy of not respecting safeties is premised on getting the running back to the safeties. From there, 1 of 3 things will happen;
the back will either make him miss
the back will run him over
the safety is going to tackle the back
If it is inevitable that the safety will make the tackle, the runing back has to punish his ass for making the tackle.
See the exact same thing happen below (with the run fits of the safeties). As you'll notice on all these pictures, on inside zone, the H will always run a bubble route away from the zone. As you'll see, it helps create a wider gap (and threat) to backside support.
Also notice the walked out backer on #2 constrict the cutback lane.
As his shoulders turn into the run, see the bubble/QB keep seam available when the OLB commits to the inside cutback.
On inside zone again, watch as the displaced safety/backer to cover down on #2 gets removed from any cutback support. First, by alignment.
Second, by respecting the horizontal stretch of #2 on a bubble.
Next, after the give, the quarterback heads straight for him on an option path. This forces the defender to have to give up the bubble, now re orientate himself to an immediate threatening quarterback run.....
Only to watch the runner cutback in the seam he has created.
Here the dive and quarterback are accounted for, but the force player is STILL wrong, and Tulsa breaks the coverage (and run support). The read key (yellow) and pitch key (red) are highlighted to illustrate the players put in conflict.
As the read key commits to the dive/zone, the quarterback pulls it and immediately attacks the pitch key.
With the pitch key abandoning the bubble H, he now plays assignment football against the option and force a pitch for a quarterback who has no back in pitch relationship. He's right, right?
WRONG! Quarterback sets and throws the bubble to the H on the perimeter.
Gain of 10 yards
For more examples of Tulsa's horizontal stretch of defenses, check out;
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