Snag & Scat Revisited

Everyone's favorite quick game is broken down in detail by one of the unsung heroes of quick game efficiency, Gunter Brewer.

Ernie Zampese: Air Coryell

Circa 1992, the backbone of "Air Coryell", Ernie Zampese, breaks down how he packages strong side, three-receiver concepts.   These universal staples are what most of the modern passing game is premised on. Get an inside look at how the Sid Gilman offense is built and why  

As lagniappe, here is Zampese's route tree from Dallas

In the coming weeks, to honor "clinic season", we'll be sharing various clinic videos (many 'vintage' era) to help your staff for next season.

Other clinic videos to check out:

http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2011/09/intro-to-zone-runs-1988-bengals.html

http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2010/06/west-coast-offense.html

http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2012/11/mooch-schools-you-on-west-coast-offense.html

http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2012/11/under-defense-pete-jenkins.html

http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2012/11/noel-mazzone-how-to-use-shallow-cross.html

Hal Mumme - Taking advantage of Y CROSS

NOEL MAZZONE - HOW TO USE SHALLOW CROSS

more at NZONE Offensive Systems 

Calvin Magee: Rodriguez Spread Offense

It wasn’t long ago that the West Virginia football program was known for an entirely different high-octane offense.  That offense was spearheaded by a coach who is now deemed a pariah after languishing at Michigan for the past few years.  Rich Rodriguez used this simple brand of  fast-paced-spread to pressure defenses during his stops at Glenville State, Tulane, Clemson and West Virginia.

Now at Pittsburgh, Calvin Magee was an integral part in developing this ‘spread to run’ offense that Rodriguez became renowned for.  In his own words and philosophy, here are 5 hours worth……

Intro to Zone Runs: 1988 Bengals

Fire up the DeLorean and insert the second 5 ¼” floppy disk into your Apple IIe!
We’re going back to 1988….


Here is a team video handout from Head Coach Sam Wyche that features a young Jim McNally (doing his best Matt Foley), Jim Anderson and Bruce Coslet.  Wyche may never get the credit he deserves for advancing the ‘modern’ game as he should, but in this time capsule we can see the evidence of his staff’s attempts to break out of the box and spread defenses.  If you lived through the 80s, I apologize for the flashbacks you’ll experience watching this, we're just offering this as a continued treatment documenting the adaptations of schemes.

McNally and Anderson cover the run game and Coslet jumps in (38:36) to review Y Option and the rest of the passing game.

The Bengals went on to be the most productive scoring (448), rushing (2,048 – 4.8 yard/carry average), and total yardage (6,057 – 7.9 yard/average) offense in the league in 1987.

BACK TO THE FUTURE: SLIDING WITH NOEL MAZZONE

Last season, Arizona State was, at least in terms of wins and losses, a very average team. After all, ASU won on six games, two of which against FCS teams. But for anybody who watched ASU play last year, it was clear that they were, perhaps, the best 6-6 team in the land. I saw them play live at Camp Randall against the Badgers and remember walking away from the game with two thoughts: 1) This team will get better as the year goes on and they will peak in November; 2) Their offense is really neat and will undoubtedly be the subject of much scrutiny in the offseason, assuming, of course, that they get it down.

Undoubtedly, ASU improved, and without question, it was due primarily to the great strides they made mastering Noel Mazzone’s new offensive scheme. In the ensuing series of posts leading up the start of the new season I will discuss in some depth the nuances of ASU’s offense. While one of my aims is clearly to shed some light on what I believe are exciting advances in the passing game, another one of my goals is to discuss the offensive thought of one of the game’s most innovative, but frequently overlooked, offensive thinkers, a coach, who, if things bounce the way they should this year, could very well end up the next HC of the University of New Mexico – Noel Mazzone. So while I will definitely talk about what Coach Mazzone is doing at ASU now, I will also provide a detailed sketch of the evolution of his offensive thought over the years, from his years at TCU of the old Southwest Conference to the Jets of the NFL.

2010 Mazzone sample series against Oregon

First, I think it would be helpful to provide a little immediate background to his current position. Dennis Erickson hired Noel Mazzone after the conclusion of the 2009 season. He replaced Erickson’s longtime friend, Rich Olson. Erickson’s decision to hire Mazzone represented a change in his offensive thinking, for while Erickson has always been a spread one-back coach, he was always more of a vertical stem, option route guy who, by and large, never invested much in the type of layered, over-under schemes for which Mazzone made his reputation.

Why Mazzone?

I guess the first question that needs to be asked is: What is so special about Mazzone’s offense that it merits such close scrutiny. I mean, sure, it was extremely effective last year, put up tons a points, even more yardage, and was, overall, very exciting, but isn’t it just another spread offense? Undoubtedly, all of this is true, but there are some differences in Mazzone’s approach that are clearly worth studying, not because they are necessarily better than those practiced by other coaches, such as Mike Leach, Tony Franklin, or June Jones, to name only three, but because it shows how spread football is progressing by returning to its origins.

Protection:

In general, most pass-heavy spread offenses employ man protection schemes. This is not something unique only to Air Raid teams, but the vast majority of single / empty spread offenses. There are many reasons for this, but one of the main reasons, I believe, is that the rise of single and empty environments coincided with that of the fire zone. To appreciate this we need to have a little history in regards the development of slide protection. Generally speaking, sliding as a means of protecting the quarterback came into vogue during the early 1980s as a way of dealing with inside and outside pressure to the quarterback’s blindside with a single move. In a sense, sliding away from the call was a way of narrowing the quarterback’s field of vision, making it so that he would not have to worry about unexpected pressure by an inside backer through the “B” gap or number 4 flying off the edge.

By and large, sliding was how most one-back teams protected during this period. But there have always been some issues related to stunts and games along the front that posed some real problems for slide teams. In particular, any type of stunt that crosses the face of the center, regardless of direction, threatens the integrity of the protection, in part, because of the kick-slide technique upon which the protection is predicated. (Matt, I’m thinking here of dogs, but of specific stunts, like the “t-chain” in which the 3 and the 4I or 5 slant the A and B gaps respectively with the shade ripping off their backsides into the opposite C) This type of movement exposes the twin problems of “depth” and “center” of the scheme; for unlike vertical set man teams, and I’m not just talking here about Air Raid programs, units that slide gain very little depth and separation from the defensive front after the snap. Consequently, any quick horizontal movement across the line’s fulcrum, the center, takes advantage of center’s compromised base, that is, the side to which he steps in order to combo on the shade with the adjacent guard or post on the one technique while keeping an eye on the stacked backer. While on paper that step may seem inconsequential, it places the center in a compromised position from which it is difficult to play catch up with any type of hard crossing action. For this reason, many one-back teams began to rely more on vertical set man schemes that enables the line to gain depth in order to “sort” and dissect the pressure as it comes.

Examples of vertical set protection

Without question, I think we can see why coaches, especially in recent years, chose to pursue man schemes, that while requiring more tweaking on a week to week basis, nevertheless, at least until recently, offered more tactical leeway for the players themselves, as well as more strategic flexibility for the coaches in terms of maximizing the number of people they could release on any given play. I bring this up because with the advent and development of fire zone packages, sliding became increasingly costly in the sense that in order to protect the QB teams were forced to limit the number of receivers they could release on a given route, which, if we pause to think for a second, simply plays into strengths of any fire zone coverage by eliminating the very receivers for which any five man pressure scheme fails to account.

And this is what makes what Noel Mazzone is doing so interesting, because unlike everybody else, ASU is very much a slide team, and one, mind you, that has hardly any issues with protection. Now, before getting into the nitty-gritty of his protections packages, let’s briefly consider why Mazzone chooses to slide. Mazzone’s reasons for sliding are simple and can be traced back to his days at Auburn. In a word, Mazzone wants the QB to focus on one thing and one thing only: THROWING TO VOIDS. That is to say, Mazzone does not want, in no uncertain terms, for the QB to be concerned with what the defense is doing; the QB’s sole job is to focus on delivering the ball. And what’s interesting about this is that because his goal to get five players out as much as possible, Mazzone, in a sense, seems to want to make it schematically impossible for the QB to bring another blocker back into the formation, and his way of doing so is to make the QB feel protected by securing the side of the field to where there is no grass.

I know that the above statement seems somewhat strange, but it really is keeping completely with the old Hal Mumme maxim of throwing the ball to the grass. But in order to appreciate this point and its import to how Mazzone slides today, let’s say a word or two about basic slide protection.

Below is basic slide protection, or what ASU today calls “ACT,” versus what I like to call “country stack,” or your garden variety 42 or 44 look.

So, working from right to left, this is what we have:

RT: Man on
RG: Man on
C: Linda call to the Mike stacked over the shade; post on the shade with the guard
LG: Set with the Center on the shade
LG: Man outside; key Will backer for possible Joker call.
RB: Key Sam to Adjuster/Strong Safety; responsible for most inside threat.
QB: Throw the Void (this is not Hot; more on this in future posts)

Now, I think the fundamentals of this protection are all fairly self evident. If the tackle senses that number four is going to come, he will make a Joker call, which will, depending on whether it’s an even or odd front, trigger either a three or four man slide to that side beginning with the first uncovered lineman.

Generally speaking, this scheme is fairly stable in that the line slides opposite the back in order to secure the QB’s backside thus making the side to which the back is checked to the call side, regardless of how many receivers are deployed there.

But what happens if the scheme, regardless of whether there is a back behind the line or not, is essentially an empty one with no check release? For all intent purposes, this nothing really changes for the line, with the exception that now the front side tackle has what amounts to a duel read in that he must eye the Sam backer and be ready to pick up the nearest inside threat, thus making the adjuster backer the sole responsibility of the QB.

As noted earlier, one of the strengths of this approach is its stability, the fact that the QB know from the very beginning that his backside is, at least in principle, secure, thus placing everything else firmly within his immediate line of vision. But this has also been one of the scheme’s greatest drawbacks, especially in the wake of the fire zone craze, because DC’s could always set their fronts, stunts, games, and fire packages to the back’s call, making moot, in effect, the very purpose of the slide itself.

Herein lies the beauty of Mazzone’s innovation, one that I believe, at some level or another, reflects the influence of the Hal Mumme, Mike Leach, and other Air Raid coaches: rather than simply slide away from the back, Mazzone freed his line to slide to where the defense was on the field, which is another way of saying, away from the grass and towards where the defense had the potential to deploy the most people.

On the surface this sounds odd, but it really makes quite a bit of sense, because across the football field there are really only three generic types of zone pressure: boundary, middle, field. Moreover, most teams, as well as conferences, for that matter, especially at the college level, usually have signature pressure packages and preferences. For example, both the Pac 12 and Big 12 are heavy field pressure conferences. Despite the fact that boundary pressure is easier to disguise, most programs in these conferences prefer to fire it up from the field, so this is where their defensive numbers are going to be. Below are two diagrams, the first offering a global perspective, the second illustrating how ASU slides to the numbers.

This is your standard field blitz from a three man front. There are different ways to package this concept, but the nuts and bolts of it are pretty simple. For the same reasons, it should be easy to see where the defense is putting its numbers. If we count the nose, we get six players to the field, leaving only five to the boundary. Yet if we were to employ a standard slide here away from the back, it immediately becomes evident that we would, in effect, be protecting away from the threat. But as the diagram below illustrates, ASU’s answer enables them to account for this with no difficulty.

So, rather than have his line slide into the boundary away from the pressure, Mazzone has his guys slide into it with a four man slide that not only seals off the interior paths of pursuit to the quarterback, but the edge as well, leaving the boundary tackle to ride the end out with the back checking inside out from Mike to Sam.

The one question that remains, however, is whether or not the frontside is now where the back ends up or his original position? Simply put, the frontside remains the side of the back’s original alignment. Now, I recognize that some may say, and rightfully so, that doesn’t this defeat the purpose of slide protection; after all, the reason coaches slide is to secure the backside, right? My answer to this is that that the secure side needs to be the side from wherever the pressure is coming from; it is senseless to protect the QB’s backside if there’s more grass there than there are jerseys with numbers on them.

Concluding Remarks:

In closing, I think it’s necessary to note that a vertical set man scheme is just as up to the task as sliding. Why, then, does Mazzone slide? In addition to the reasons outlined at the beginning of this piece, we should consider the place of the drop-back game within the whole of his offense. One reason Mazzone continues to slide is because of the extent to which his quick, screen, and zone games are integrated into a near seamless whole with his dropback package. In essence, Mazzone views these not as separate aspects of the offense, but as protective extensions of his core passing game. And by “protective” I mean that they tie so well into his slide protection scheme not only tactically, that is, how they appear to the defense, but also, and perhaps more importantly, pedagogically for his offense’s players. So, from a global perspective, provides Mazzone with a flexible way of protecting the QB that also enables the other central components of his relatively simple, if not reductionist, yet incredibly dynamic offensive system.



>>> MORE FROM HEMLOCK <<<<

Why Quick?

Since the end of the bowl season I’ve noticed a number of threads on various sites devoted to the quick game. Given the fact that we are living through the “Spread” age in football this hardly comes as a surprise. What is surprising, however, is the number of posts in which coaches speculate as to how relevant a quick game package is to an offense that bases out of the gun anyway. After all, should it not be possible to simply build your quick package into your basic 5 step package anyway, either via hots, sight-adjustments, or some form or the other of flare control?

There are six reasons why one needs to throw quick:
1. Horizontal Stretch
2. Force defensive numbers to be even in the box.
3. Force hard support control
4. Identify the leverage on the perimeter.
5. Find where the defense is not on the field.
6. Blitz control.

I think relationship between reasons one and two is pretty obvious. If you are a spread team, operating in a four-wide environment, the quick game functions as a way to structurally set the defense and to get an idea as to how the defense is going to defend the box. In a sense, your quick package should do for you what double-tight does for an ACE team in that it should force the defense to balance up, which should enable the offense to get a hat-on-a-hat in both the running and passing games. In other words, the horizontal stretch the quick game creates should prevent overloads from occurring in one form or another. In so doing, the quick game also enables you to identify the specific areas in a given defensive structure that you will want to isolate and exploit by way of the five-step game.

In the same way that one and two work together, so do three and four. If you create a good horizontal stretch and even the defense the defense will begin to play hard support, thus flattening the under coverage out, creating, in effect, more man to man situations in which defenders will, by the leverage of their technique, be in a less effective position to play good run support. In addition, this will clarify the defense’s leverage and subsequent pursuit angles.

Reason five, I believe, helps explain why the quick game is an invaluable tool: it helps identify, at early stage in any game, where defenders are and where they are not. In this sense, the quick game is tool for probing that helps an offense identify where along a broad defensive front it should concentrate its spearheads.

Blitz control, reason six, albeit important, is not, in my opinion, the primary reason one should throw quick. Yes, it’s imperative that an offense have the ability to get the ball off quickly off of a short drop, but certainly there are other tools an offense has at its disposal that can not only serve as a blitz deterrent, if desired, but that are a more sure fire way to make a defense pay for blitzing, such as screens, for example.

In a place of a conclusion, I would like to say a word or two about how the quick game figures into the historical evolution one-back offenses. I know this will sound like ancient history, but the one-back offense, as we understand it today, in the modern post-Jack Elway / Pink Erickson sense (and for those that don’t know, Pink is Dennis’ father), developed out of a desire to find an easy and economically teachable way to spread the ball out to the perimeter in order to displace defenders and open the running game. What people forget is that the passing game of the modern one-back offense, the one that Dennis Erickson popularized throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s, but not the one he runs today at ASU with Noel Mazzone, revolved around a vertical stem quick game whose main objective was to create a horizontal stretch that would displace the Sam backer, create a 4-2 box, but one with a two hi shell that would enable the offense to run a power inside and outside zone running game, preferably to the low shade of the defense. So, even in its modern beginnings, the quick game was really not designed as a way to beat the blitz, but rather as means to an end for running the football.

In my next posting, I will talk at some length about the questions a staff needs to ask itself as it conceptualizes its program’s quick package.

Snag

2 Man Snag



3 Man Snag

..........and some context to these videos
http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2009/09/snag-route-noel-mazzone-ny-jets.html

Justin Fuente: TCU Offense Key Concepts

After spending considerable time delving into the defensive approach of Gary Patterson at TCU, it would only be right that we spent a little bit of time on the other side of the ball. Since the Rose Bowl, offensive coordinator Justin Fuente has been a hot property, with unfounded rumors of him being approached by LSU for the same position.

In this post, we will take a look at a few key concepts TCU carried with them every week and explore how versatile they can be. With the help of these simple adaptations, since Fuente took over in 2009 TCU has ranked 4th and 5th in scoring in the nation (2010 and 2009, respectively).

Fuente, a former RB coach, was looking for a way that accentuated their run-heavy approach, with an emphasis on simplicity and efficiency. Without having a dominant receiver at the time, the challenge was trying to find the simplest way to get the ball into a variety of player’s hands without spending an inordinate amount of time diverting from their core offense.

DOUBLE PIVOT (trips to the field)

Usually run out of 5-wide, this 5-step concept features enough answers to afford the quarterback clear reads for a smart throw. While an adaptation of the standard Post-Dig run by everyone, Fuente uses this as an effective way to manufacture space to the field. By attacking/occupying inside underneath defenders with the double-pivots (pivot draws the inside linebackers outside, to open the dig), the combination of a deep dig-post creates a middle-of-the-field conflict for the safety.

This is a great play when you want to avoid the corners by creating an inside Hi-Lo going down the field (whip/dig/post) and feature your running backs in space. TCU is so confident in this concept that they don’t feel they don’t need a specific defensive look to run it, so when they run freeze / OC check tempo, they never have to check out of it.

The base concept features the boundary #1 receiver running a 14 yard dig with the #2 receiver aggressively attacking the alley defender (WLB here). Fuente’s coaching point for the whip/pivot player is to actually try to grab this overhang defender, as this exaggerates the separation for the routes the quarterback will be keying (“push in – whip out”). If this receiver gets “turned loose” by the defense (if defender drops), the receiver should just stop. As they say, “ if you’re open, stay open”.

The offense is looking to attack the WLB on the 2-man side whip and the MLB on the 3-man side whip. This combination will stretch these two inside defenders outside, chasing the receivers after they stick and break for the flat. By moving these two inside defenders, the dig opens behind them in the (middle) hole.

To the field, the inside receiver will run the same whip route being run by the boundary #2 to hold the safety or linebacker that could rob the dig. The #1 receiver will just run a ‘take-two’ route (fly) to coverage away from the dig and threaten the deep safety. Its crucial that this receiver takes an outside release or will risk defeating the defensive stretch in the middle of the field. The field #2 receiver runs a modified post, actually trying to get all the way across the other side of the field. This ensures that if the linebacker takes the whip and the safety takes the dig, you still have an answer.

Pre snap, the quarterback will find space to anticipate where the open grass will be (coverage shell / leverage alignment). At the snap, he will look to the field first and then to the boundary. The decision logic will look to qualify the vertical by #1. If he cannot make this throw, he will then go immediately direct his focus to throw the away-side whip outside.

As a change up to the ‘double pivot’ (and one that TCU uses a majority of the time now), and to feature a better receiver on the dig; the Y and the outside receiver can switch routes. Nothing will change for the QB, as the Hi-Lo occurs on the same 3 man side inside the hashes.

The first explosive play in the Rose Bowl this year (video) from TCU was Double Pivot Y and is a perfect example of what the running back on a linebacker matchup looks like.


PORSCHE (trips to the boundary)

This is TCU’s way to matchup with teams that are just better than they are by using rubs and leverage in the quick game. This cheap 3-step concept premised entirely on featuring a backside split receiver to the field. The backside receiver can be featured in whatever route he runs well (hitch, fade, speed out, etc), but commonly will run the slant because of its simplicity.

Fuente will run this out of 3x1 or 3x2, with the rationale being coverage will either be rolled to the 3 receiver side (away from the featured receiver) or be deficient in numbers against trips. As most defenses will respect the 3 receivers, with a single receiver split to the field, the space created provides a clear path to the ball/throw.

At presnap, the quarterback will qualify the receiver split to the field (is this throw viable? Is there an overhang defender in the path of this throw).

If there is no overhang defender and the corner has a sizeable cushion on the receiver, this is the throw the quarterback will make. If there is no overhang defender and no safety over the top and the corner is tight, the route will be converted to sluggo. If it is a press corner with a safety over the top (Cover 2), then the quarterback will work to the trips side as the defensive numbers cannot support covering 3 receivers into the boundary.

The 3x2 version of this includes an inside receiver to help divert the alley defender (having the #2 receiver immediately break inside across the face of the defender) away from the slant.

If the field receiver is disqualified, the quarterback simply diverts his attention to the curl-flat combo in trips. The trips combo features a hitch by #1, a hunt/In route (6 yards over the ball) by #2, and a flat by #3, into the boundary. They can achieve this look in many different ways and often times with motion to the trips with zone-read play action. Into trips is just a defender read over the #2 receiver;

• If the boundary linebacker still hangs and doesn’t chase the IN, then the curl is not open (throw the In route)
  
• If the boundary LB chases the flat, the curl is open

While not a successful play in the video provided, as you can see, its just a simple read off the cushion of the defender over #1 to the field. With as much distance established with the split receiver, there won’t be anything to challenge the short-inside throw (slant).

  CHEETOS 

The “cheetos” play is very similar to how many spread teams are using the quarterback as a between-the-tackles runner (Dash), when the passer isn’t the most gifted ball carrier. In 2009, Fuente called this play 40 times for a total of 400 yards. This play developed by mistaken (much like zone-read) and actually works better when your offensive line is struggling with blocking stretch. This is simply a 3x1 (power) zone read, “run backwards”. The back will run his stretch course (aiming at the hip of the tight end), but the offensive line will block power. This action provides a dual-threat, optioning off the playside defensive end.

• If the DE gets upfield, the QB goes upfield (keep)
  
• If the DE squats or squeezes, the QB gives

The severe angle of stretch angle (perimeter threat), the playside linebacker will usually fast flow with the defensive end, creating the wide path for the quarterback to run inside.
Where the defense comes in conflict is not just the defense end (C gap defender), but also the safety. Because the horizontal stretch becomes so great (one true inside threat plus a wide perimeter threat), the alley defender can be put into a bind as to the proper path to take on this action.

The beauty of this play is that there really are no additional concepts to be taught to the players (you’re just combining power and stretch) and it can be applied to Wildcat looks simply by changing the player taking the snap. The offensive line will simply down block into their inside gap-track, with the backside guard pulling for the playside linebacker (he’ll end up picking up the first man that shows on give).

Spacing...The Final Frontier - part 4

The final read in the Spacing progression is the Flat route.  This is a 2003 Toledo cut-up when Rob Spence was the OC there.  The frontside X WR has a Speed Out.  The QB sees the CB up tight initially and decides that the Speed Out will not be not there.  The QB should have stayed with this route because the CB was bailing out, albeit slowly.  The depth of the CB is one consideration for the QB's pre-snap read; the other consideration is the presence of an alley player.  The nearest LB was not in the alley, but was tucked in the box, so he was not a threat to the route.  The alley is defined as the area between the X WR and the OT to a depth of 8 yards.

If there is no one in the alley, this is considered a Premium look.  Although this was a Hard Access (no alley player and a "Hard" CB within 6 yds) look initially, it became a Free Access (no alley player and a loose CB) look to the X WR.  Defenses like to disguise their coverages to confuse the QB's pre-snap read, so it is important for the QB to get a post-snap read and follow through on his progression by looking to the X WR first. 

Free Access is the look that the QB wants to see from the Defense.  Many teams put their best WR at the X position so they create these Free Access looks and isolate their main guy 1 on 1.  This is done by overloading the opposite side of the formation with Trips or Bunch formations, as Toledo does here. 

The OL is using Slide protection to the right with the RB blocking the first thing off the left edge away from the slide.  The use of motion in Spacing can be an effective way to disguise the play initially, since a compressed split is needed by the WR to get to his spot on the Mini-Curl route, which is roughly 4 yards outside the OT.  The WR also could get to his spot here by running his route in at a 45 degree angle. 

The QB also could have thrown to the Sit route if he puts the ball on the opposite shoulder of the defender.  The Mini-Curl is double-covered, leaving the Flat route wide open.  Florida QB Coach Scot Loeffler said at the 2009 Florida Clinic that the Flat route should be run at "golf-cart" speed--fast initially, and then choke it down.  He wants to be fast initially to get past the Mini-Curl's route and make the Flat player on Defense commit.  The flat player cannot cover both in Cover 3 if the "spacing" is right.  It is important for the Flat WR to choke it down so he doesn't run out of bounds and has room to run up the sidelines.  The FB running the Flat route choked it down, but the QB led him a bit too much on the outside, making it hard for the FB to stay in-bounds and get upfield. 

Spacing (to Flat route) @ Yahoo! Video

This concludes the Spacing series.  Click on the Spacing Label below if you would like to see the previous posts.

Spacing...The Final Frontier - part 3

Here is Spacing on the backside of two-man Scat, which the Saints run a good bit in the cut-ups I have seen. Both are good 1 Hi concepts, which is what the Bucs Defense is in here. Scat can be deadly vs. Man in that it has an option for the RB to wheel up if the LB is chasing him. Scat takes a little bit longer than the regular Quick game concepts, so it is technically a five-step concept. Brees takes a quick three-step drop from the Gun. He sees that his frontside concept is not there, so he hitches up and begins his Spacing progression: Sit to Mini-Curl to Flat route. The Sit route is covered, but the Mini-Curl is open and Brees shows his precision by putting the ball to the side away from the defender maximize YAC (yards after catch).

Spacing (to Mini-Curl) @ Yahoo! Video

Pass Protection

The Pass Protection is a six man protection: half-man, half-slide with the FB check-releasing the two LB/DBs in the box to his side. This would be called 60 protection (60 = to the Right, 61 would be to the Left). 60 Protection is to the Right, so the covered/uncovered rules would start from the Right and go to the Left. The RT is covered and the RG is covered because both have a man head up or outside of them. They are the "Man" side and they will block the defender covering them. The Center is the first Uncovered lineman and he starts the Slide to the Left. The Center, LG, and the LT all slide backside--one gap to the Left. The LG will help out the Center with the 1 technique NT until a LB causes him to come off that block.

The FB check-releases by reading 1 to 2, from inside-out. If both 1 and 2 blitz, he will block #1, who would be the most dangerous. Also, if both 1 and 2 blitz, #2 would be an unblocked defender that the QB is responsible for. If 1 and 2 are coming from depth (blitzing from LB depth), the QB should be fine. If both 1 and 2 walk up on the LOS (line of scrimmage), then the QB or Center might need to change the protection.

There are also two LBs to the left of the Center. The Saints have 3 OL vs. 2 DL to the left, so one of the OL will be able to pick up one of the LBs should they blitz. If both LBs blitz, the OL is responsible for the most dangerous LB (the one nearest to the QB) and the QB is responsible for the other LB. The QB will have to get rid of the ball before the unblocked rusher gets there.

60 Protection @ Yahoo! Video

We will conclude the Spacing series with part 4 being the final read in the Spacing progression: the Flat route. Click on the Spacing tag below to see the previous Spacing posts.

Spacing...The Final Frontier - part 2

More Spacing to get you through the summer...Here is the Spacing route on the backside of Slant. The protection is a 6 man slide to the left with the RB picking up the right DE. QB's initial thought process is Slant vs. Cover 2 and 3-man Spacing vs. Cover 3. Andrew Coverdale would describe this as a non-premium look, meaning there is an overhang LB or safety is in the alley in position to help vs. the Slant. More specifically, this would be called Limited Access because of the Loose CB. Bottom line, the QB knows the Slant probably isn't going to be open.


The QB has a three-step drop. He will still peek at the Slant on his first step in his drop just in case the alley player blitzes. Also, this "peek" to the single-side X WR will help open up the Sit route. The QB will peek at the Slant, then his progression is Sit to Mini-Curl to Flat route. Here the Sit route to the TE is open, so he takes it right away. I'm a perfectionist who unsuccessfully tries to not be too critical, but the throw by the QB could be better. The Air Raid Settle and Noose drill has the QB practice passing the ball to the shoulder opposite of the nearest defender. I would like to see a more accurate throw to the left shoulder of the TE here to help with the YAC (yards after catch) but I'll still praise my QB for the correct read and for moving the chains with a 5 yd throw that turns into a 10-11 yd gain.

Next time, we'll look at Spacing to the Mini-Curl.

Slant Space (to Sit route) @ Yahoo! Video

PowerPoint Downloads:

West Coast Offense

Had a little time to browse through my vids this weekend and coincidentally enough a discussion popped up recently going over the nuances that differentiate the "WCO" from the "Air Raid" offensive system. My thoughts on the matter were

"...from what I can tell, Air Raid is an "idiots guide to passing" (via the WC concepts).

Anymore, Air Raid is all gun, and uses probably 10% of what most WC offenses use. Also, the AR progressions are deep first / shallow last, whereas WC is primarily short first, deep last.

I'll post some Callahan / Gruden clips later in the week (2000-era) in skelly (w/ play name/tag) and it is all over the place.

AR is just a handful of concepts - there isn't much to it - with an ample sprinkling of screens.

As far as the RnS influence, I could definitely see the stealing of (philosophical) concept of verticals-to-sail - basing out of a vertical stretch into other concepts (which is essentially the RnS....vertical, to balanced, to choice routes). If you go from Verticals, then to Sail, then to Dig/Shallow, you can bridge that to RnS, pretty easily."

In the meantime, here are some clips for posterity of the Gruden/Callahan Oakland Raiders during a skelly session. Play names are included in the posts, feel free to correct me as needed or offer any other comments.



I felt this was makes for an interesting discussion because it is through these concepts that you can trace the evolution of the modern game (or watch it as it takes place) back to its roots. You can see how concepts become more and more streamlined as the superflous chaff (less efficient method / terminology) is removed. You can see where Air Raid staples were derived from and this illustrates the adaptation of the passing game.


For Additional Readings:
http://www.westcoastoffense.com/
http://www.westcoastoffense.com/
http://www.amazon.com/Spread-Offense-Passing-Game/dp/B000GAKPBS

Spacing...The Final Frontier

The topic of 4 man Spacing came up recently, and this is the one cut-up I have of it. The play is Sluggo Space. Sluggo is the frontside route with spacing on the backside. Besides being 4 man instead of 3 man spacing, this play has another variation that the Saints use on occasion as well. Spacing usually has a Swing route from the RB in the backfield. Instead of the Swing route, the RB/WR can be split out wide and run the Hitch route.

The RB in the backfield is running the Shallow stop route. This route and the Mini-Curl route by F give the QB a 2 on 1 vs. the Sam in Cover 2 as I learned from Dan Gonzalez on the Huey board.

The QB is taught to look to the Sluggo vs. 1 Hi and to Spacing vs. 2 Hi. The defense is in Cover 2 here, which tells the QB to look backside, but the Sluggo still works because the safety gets a bit too nosy. Aggressive Cover 2 safeties don't like it when you hit a couple of Slants in front of them. Once set up properly, Sluggo can be a big play vs. Cover 2. Notice the pump fake by the QB to help get the safety to bite. We hit this for a couple of TDs the same way at my old school.

Sluggo Space @ Yahoo! Video

For the Tech Geeks:
The drawing of the play before the video clip is from a powerpoint slide. I stole this idea from Coverdale's video playbook and from others on this board. If you are making a video playbook, the best way to draw that play up so that your players can best visualize the concept is to "grab" a picture just before the snap of the ball from a video clip as a .gif picture file and put it into PowerPoint.

Then right-click on a PowerPoint slide and go to Format Background and click on Picture or texture fill. Next click on the File button and select your .gif file. The whole slide will be a picture of the play right before the ball is snapped.

Then, use the Drawing Tools to make arrows (and I would recommend to use Shape Effects and put a shadow on the line so it stands out and has a better contrast with the football field behind it). You can also use X,Y, Z player labels and 1,2,3 labels for the QB's reads (it looks best with a circle around the letter or number IMO).

You will then need to save the slide with the drawing so you can import it into your video. Click on the Windows icon in the top left corner and go down to Save As and then click on Other Formats. Click on File name and name the slide and then click on Save as type and save as .jpeg. It will ask you to export every slide or the current slide--click on Current Slide only.

Note: It is a good idea to save the play slide as a .gif file the first time and then save it as a .jpeg the 2nd time after you draw the play up. This lets you go back and fix the play if you change anything on the drawing and it's easy to differentiate between the original pic and the drawn-up pic file.

Another idea I got from a fellow Huey member is this: show the pass play drawn up (wide angle, leave the diagram up about 5 seconds), then show the play; again show the play drawn up, and then show the play in 50% speed. Finally, show the play from the tight angle.

It looks nice, but it is time consuming.

Screen Game - Allen Rudolph (Southeastern Louisiana)

The next few posts will cover a round table-type 4 hour discussion on offensive line play. This was an attempt by ULL OC, Ron Hudson, to kickoff a type of Southern C.O.O.L. clinic. Hudson plans on expanding this forum in the future and it would be something of a 1-back offensive line conclave. The discussions taking place this day consisted of presenting a concept then sharing perspectives between various coaches off that theme.

Allen Rudolph and Chris Truax share philosophy on handling OL

As you will see/hear, quite a bit of information is shared and problems discussed. This deviates from the standard fare of rote lecturing present at most clinics.

To start the morning, Southeastern Louisiana Offensive Coordinator, Allen Rudolph, shared his approach to slow (RB) screens.

( Click for Audio of Clinic )

RB Landmark screens
Rudolph bases his RB landmark screens of their 4 vertical principle; receivers will use a 15 yard takeoff unless tagged with a “crack” call (at the LOS). They also will choose to simply run 5-step concept routes, while the back and line engage the screen (Drive /Choice concepts).

The offensive line technique progression is to:

• Set
• Punch
• Extend
• Release

For the split receivers with a "crack" call, they don't want him to settle and engage a box player. Instead, they simply want the receiver to make (any) contact, and "take his head off". At worst, the receiver will have bought the back a split-second to break free. At best, it will knock a defender out of pursuing the play.

How do they deal with trash underneath or a DL twist in the way of the screen?
If the defensive line stops and peeks, the offensive line will redirect and take it. Rudolph does not use a 'rat killer' (who will double-back after releasing on the screen and pick up any backside pursuit).

The PSG engaged in the screen will sprint to the numbers; if the LB closes (from inside-out), he will pick him up. The RB landmark is 3-5 yards outside the tackle box (hash landmark)

PST – no set/cut; pass set kick slide
BST – does whatever

If confronted with a head up (4) or inside (4i) guy on the tackle, the PST & PSG combo to release ('you' / 'me' call on who kicks to screen and who engages the DE). If both are unsure about the box (look), they will make a 'grey call', meaning it is definite pass call to tackle (‘you’ tackle kicks to screen).

RB Throwback screens

Rudolph uses throwback screens in conjunction with slide protection as it allows the QB to set deeper and extend the launch point. Although this can be run out of any formation, the rules remain simple. Engaging the frontside tackle, guard, and center, the assignment depends on how the line sets after the play.

Rather than having static assignments that can cause a play to fail if one man doesn't fulfill his role, he has these linemen release at the same level so they can see and communicate who becomes what role within the screen. The first man out (not always the PST) will pick up the first opposite color jersey and kick out. The second man will continue pursuing the landmark (hash when ball is in the middle / top of the numbers when ball is on the hash) and then engage the first man outside. The remaining lineman will follow the second lineman to the landmark and engage the first man inside.

1-first color
2-first to landmark
3-next inside threat

Rudolph allows his linemen to cut on perimeter ONLY if the defender is coming downhill (aggressive). In any other situation, he requires his offensive line to gather their feet and attack the V of the neck (of the defender).

The key coaching point on his throwback screen is that the offensive line has to be flat on their release. If the linemen can't see the other (lineman) guy, then they will have no idea what their relationship to the point of attack (1,2, or 3) is. If the line releases at angles, they will often have responsibility overlap and pit two linemen on one defender.

Troubleshooting Screens
Rudolph uses four simple tenets to determine what went wrong when screens don't work (how to screw this up) to ensure that the execution is bulletproof.

• Line or backs leave too early
• The line is not flat down LOS
• Not cracking when man coverage
• Don’t bring the running back across the formation vs man (inviting linebackers into the box)

Teaching Your Players In The Classroom - Ed Zaunbrecher

Any excuse to travel into the heart of the cajun triangle is a good one and be it for football...well, even betta.

Before we dove head first into the weekend's festivities, we HAD to partake in the legendary cajun cuisine of Prejeans. The Crab Au Gratin was delicious and our creole waitress, Trista, (with her French accent) was even more.

The next few series of posts (this week) will be talks from this weekend's UL-Lafayette Ragin Cajun Clinic. Among the list of presenters (that I'll be sharing) were Pete Jenkins (Phil Eagles), William Jones (EMCC), Chris Truax (SFA), Allen Rudolph (SLU), and Ron Hudson (ULL). As stated previously, I am a big fan of podcasting for efficiently assimilating information (through passive stimulation).

This first installment features, Rice Offensive Coordinator, Ed Zaunbrecher, on the methodology for teaching your offensive players in the classroom. This is a great precursor to understanding offensive philosophy and basic offensive concepts.

The mp3 to the clinic lecture is located here

Enjoy!

Teaching the QB in the Classroom
Coach must first be able to give specifics to QB

• Details – fits a system
• Accountability – consistency
• Communication – teaching tools
• Reference for staff
• Continuity when coaches change

Defensive Concepts

• Fronts
• All you expect to see
• Number in box
• Shade-3 tech
• End inside or outside
• Overload
• Coverage rotation
• Free man in protection
• Coverages
• Middle open or closed
• Man or zone
• Areas open and covered
• Spot drop or matchup
• Where are potential blitzers
• What do they allow quickly

Teaching Progression Day 1

• Introduce in classroom drawing
• Film study if possible
• Individual techniques
• Individual timing
• Group vs Air
• Pass skel or inside run
• Team

Teaching Progression Day 2

• Review
• Practice Film
• Question and Answer- if they can’t tell you they don’t know
• Onfield timing
• Pass skel-inside run
• Team

Teaching Tools

• Installation schedule- more thorough-nothing omitted
• Playbook-handouts
• Take notes
• Teaching tapes
• Walk throughs
• Board work
• Homework

Sample Play

• Purpose of play
• Uses
• Concepts involved
• Formations used
• Protection-hots
• Quick throws
• Middle closed reads
• Middle open reads
• Man reads
• Possible adjustments
• Eyes

New Orleans Saints Passing Game (Part II)

Continuing the New Orleans Saints Passing Game, we move from their vertical-stretching 5-step game into their deadly 3-step horizontal stretch.

SPACING
If you have to defend four vertical receivers, you’ll be looking to keep a cushion on the receivers and safeties deep to prevent them from getting over the top. What happens when those receivers bolt out of their stance only to come up short (quickly)? With four deep defenders, you’re not left with many bodies left to cover the 53 1/3 yard width of the field underneath (horizontal stretch). This leads us to the spacing concept and its variations.

After threatening and torching DBs with the 5-step game, what do you do when those same receivers come up short on their stem and break short? You're left with a big cushion between the receiver and the ball.

Previously covered here, with its variations stick , scat, and snag, these short concepts allow receivers to gain immediate horizontal leverage on underneath defenders, gain separation, and allow the quarterback to quickly throw a completion.

SCREENS

Again working off the 5-step passing game, the utilization of screens to trap an over aggressive defense underneath creates another dimension of attack. So for a defense, just wildly attacking the quarterback won't get it done (because you only open up the effectiveness of the screens). Getting full use out of the athleticism of their running backs and tight ends, the Saints can further isolate less athletic defenders in space by showing a ‘deep pass threat’ (drop back action) then throwing to a back (feigning blocking) with a linemen leading on the perimeter for them.

RB Screens

Here we'll see backs Reggie Bush and Pierre Thomas athleticism exploiting linebackers and safeties to get to the perimeter.

TE Screens

With versatile players like Jeremy Shockey, David Thomas, Billy Miller, and Heath Evans (now Jason McKie), the Saints can create a 3-way threat H-back. Using these players in such a role further aids the run game and deep passing game.

PLAY ACTION

BOOT

As with any good zone / stretch running team, the bootleg off of run action is a great way to slow down and victimize backside defensive edge pressure. A back or tight end will release backside (of run action) with a post (playside of run action) creating a two-level horizontal stretch that a quarterback can be assured of an easy downfield completion.

FLOOD

The flood concept creates a three-level sideline stretch after freezing the defense with run action. With a receiver deep (outside the hash), a receiver intermediate (outside the hash), and a back flaring to the flat; the quarterback is assured a completion by overloading a defense to one side.

I hope this overview of 5-step, 3-step, and complimentary passes provides a 100-foot perspective of how these concepts are employed to keep a defense on their heels. With a myriad of ways to attack on any given play, every down becomes a "passing down" regardless of field position. This versatility also alleviates pressure on the offensive line both in pass protection and run blocking. Because the defense cannot pin their ears back and focus on one or two game plan elements, they are forced to slow down and react, allowing the offense to dictate the tempo of the game (and why you'll often see Sean Payton open games with up-tempo/no-huddle drives).

PROLOGUE

PART I - VERTICAL
PART II - HORIZONTAL
PART III - SEAN PAYTON QUARTERBACKING